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Most constitutional challenges in federal court to federal statutes are litigated in the familiar
pattern of a decision by a single U.S. District Judge, followed by an appeal to a three-judge panel of
one of the U.S. Court of Appeals, followed by the filing of a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme
Court, which has discretion to grant or deny the writ. Sometimes, however, Congress requires a
separate path for constitutional challenges to particular federal statutes, with the frequent
challenges to provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, such as in Citizens United v.
FEC (2010), being a notable example. These provisions often provide for the convening of a threejudge district court, usually in the District of Columbia, followed by an ostensibly mandatory
appeal to the Supreme Court. They often also permit members of Congress to bring or intervene in
such actions, and mandate that the federal courts decide the cases in an expeditious manner. All
of these characteristics are absent from the typical challenge to federal statutes.
These atypical jurisdictional provisions in effect establish specialized if ad hoc federal courts to rule
on constitutional issues. The causes and consequences of specialized federal constitutional courts
are an understudied phenomenon in the scholarly literature, a gap filled by this article. The
Article first summarizes the history of the three-judge district court, founded to consider all
constitutional challenges to federal statutes, from its establishment in 1937 to its repeal in 1976.
It next documents the instances when Congress has subsequently created such courts on a statutespecific basis, and addresses the rationales advanced in the legislative history, namely, uncertainty
over a statute’s constitutionality, and the asserted need to promptly resolve that issue. The Article
then subjects the partial revival of such courts to critical examination. It argues that a complex
and sometimes inconsistent set of reasons, including but not limited to Congressional abdication of
constitutional deliberation to the judicial branch, explains the ad hoc adoption of these statutes.
The Article argues that other provisions of these laws, such as mandating venue in the District of
Columbia or expeditious treatment, are unnecessary. Finally, it contends that cases litigated before
these courts have a possibly deleterious impact on the quality of decisions in the Supreme Court.
The Article concludes that Congress should not pass these statutes and rather permit all
constitutional litigation to proceed in a uniform manner.
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The modern Congress sails close to the wind all the time. Federal
statutes today often all but acknowledge their questionable constitutionality with provisions for accelerated judicial review [and] for standing on
the part of members of Congress . . . .
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner

1

I. INTRODUCTION
Two of the most contentious and controversial decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in recent years, National Federation of In2
3
dependent Business v. Sebelius and Citizens United v. FEC share many
common characteristics. Both were 5-4 decisions respectively upholding and striking down high-profile legislative enactments of Congress
as a matter of constitutional law, which garnered enormous attention
during the litigation processes and after the decisions. Scores of amicus curiae briefs were filed in both cases. Public debate before and
after the decisions focused on the predicted and presumed ideological voting of the Justices and on the effect of the decisions on the
4
economy and the political system, respectively.
But the cases differed in important respects: in how they were litigated and how they reached the Supreme Court. NFIB v. Sebelius was
decided as are most constitutional challenges to federal statutes. Suit
was brought by private parties before a single judge in a U.S. District
Court, seeking a ruling that the individual mandate of the Affordable
Care Act was unconstitutional. The judge held for the plaintiffs, and
the government appealed to the regional U.S. Court of Appeals. Upon losing there, the government filed a writ of certiorari in the Su5
preme Court, which the Court granted. Parallel litigation by other

1
2
3

4

5

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 248 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act of
2010).
558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down provision of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, which limited independent expenditures by corporations during political campaigns).
For discussions of the significance of these decisions in the Roberts Court, see, e.g.,
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 230–31
(10th ed. 2014) (discussing the role of amicus briefs in Citizens United); Pamela S. Karlan,
Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (2012) (discussing the implications of Citizens United); Jeffrey Rosen, Can the Judicial Branch be a Steward in a Polarized Democracy?,
DÆDALUS, 25, 25 (2013) (discussing the “ideological lines” of the Roberts Court).
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs. 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Nat'l Fed'n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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parties proceeded in other district courts and courts of appeals, and,
indeed as the Court noted, those cases generated a split of authority
6
on the constitutionality of the Act.
Citizens United proceeded on a different litigation path. In the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act (BCRA), Congress had included a
provision that mandated that any constitutional challenge to the Act
be brought before a three-judge district court convened in the District Court for the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal of any
7
decision to the Supreme Court. That provision also granted members of Congress standing to bring suit to challenge the Act, and fur8
ther mandated that the federal courts expeditiously resolve the suit.
Suit was brought by, among others, the then-minority leader of the
Senate, and the Act was upheld by a three-judge district court in the
District of Columbia. No other litigation was or could be filed, so no
district—or circuit—split existed. The Supreme Court, as it usually
does with ostensibly mandatory appeals, noted probable jurisdiction
in the case, set it for briefing and oral argument, and decided it on
9
the merits.
The special jurisdictional provisions of the BCRA are not an isolated phenomenon. In the past several decades Congress has enacted
more than a dozen of these provisions (similar or identical to those in
the BCRA) in other statutes, and considered their adoption in other
10
bills introduced but not passed in Congress. These provisions in effect create specialized federal constitutional courts, temporarily convened with borrowed federal judges for the sole purpose of deciding
the constitutionality of a federal statute. They raise important issues
of the law and policy of federal courts. For example, why does Congress pass these provisions, and do they have virtues (or vices) not
shared with the normal litigation process? Are Justice Antonin Scalia
and Professor Bryan Garner right to conclude that the presence of
these provisions shows that the underlying statute is of dubious con11
stitutionality? Are cases before specialized courts qualitatively de6
7
8
9

10
11

Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2581 (listing other circuits that “have also heard challenges to the
individual mandate”).
Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 81, 113–14 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h).
Id. at § 403(a)–(c), 116 Stat 113–14.
Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 552 U.S. 1278 (2008), reargument ordered on appeal after remand, 557
U.S. 932 (2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Listings of both are found in infra Part III.
Scalia and Garner list a third characteristic commonly found in these special review provisions, which are “fall-back dispositions should the primary disposition be held unconstitutional.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 249. Fall-back provisions are found in statutes
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cided differently than constitutional challenges litigated in the normal process? There has been relatively little sustained discussion of
12
these issues in the scholarly literature, and this Article begins to fill
that gap.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II addresses the use of specialized courts in the federal system. Such courts are now prevalent
for unique areas of subject matter, but have historically been rare for
constitutional challenges to federal statutes. In 1937 Congress mandated that all such challenges be brought before a three-judge district
court convened in an appropriate venue in the United States, with a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Congress abolished the threejudge court provision in 1976 and repealed the mandatory appeal for
such cases in 1988. Part III of the Article documents the revival of
such provisions in the three decades since. The legislative history of
those provisions, such as it is, indicates that some members of Congress were unsure of the constitutionality of the underlying statute.
Moreover, it also indicates some members of Congress seemed to
think that special review provisions would lead to an appropriate and
prompt resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court.
Part IV of the Article subjects the passage and use of these provisions to critical analysis. This Part first examines the reasons Congress passes special review provisions. None of them are particularly
persuasive reasons to depart from the usual judicial review process,
and Congress has not added these provisions in a consistent way to
the entire range of federal statutes potentially subject to constitutional attack. The special review provisions seem emblematic of Congress
frequently discarding its responsibility to independently consider the
constitutionality of statutes. Likewise, a complex and even contradic-

12

both establishing, and not establishing, special review provisions. While not unrelated to
the issues addressed here, further discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. For further discussion, see Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 304 (2007)
(highlighting constitutional and policy concerns regarding the use of fallback provisions
in legislation).
The special review provisions are discussed in Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 442–44 (2001); Neal
Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modern Supreme
Court’s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 356–57 (1997);
Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1277, 1311 (2001); Joshua Panas, Note, Out of Control?: Congressional Power to Shape Judicial Review of New Legislation, 1 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 151 (2002). Provisions calling for expeditious court resolution are discussed in William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A
Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 763 (1997)
(“[T]he Habeas Reform Act requires a court of appeals to take no more than thirty days
to dispose of a prisoner’s motion . . . .”).
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tory set of reasons by supporters and opponents of a particular statute
may account for these provisions. For example, opponents of a statute may support inclusion of the provisions to make it easier and
quicker for a court to strike it down.
Part IV next addresses the frequent practice of vesting exclusive
jurisdiction in the federal courts in the District of Columbia. The
specialized jurisdiction of that court in other matters, such as administrative law, may well be justified, but it does not support similar geographic specialization for constitutional matters. Except for some
unique topics, like patent law, the federal judiciary has long resisted
geographic specialization, and the use of the District of Columbia
courts in this instance violates the norm of regional dispersion of the
jurisdiction of trial courts and courts of appeals.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the special review provisions from the
perspective of their effect on Supreme Court decision-making. This
Part argues that the Court typically benefits from the percolation of
issues in different federal courts, and the special review provision deprives the Court of information possibly gained from that percolation. The expeditious review mandate often found in these provisions is unnecessary, since federal judges in the usual process are
capable of rapid trial and appeals decisions when necessary. Congress had good reasons to abolish the three-judge district court for
constitutional attacks on federal statutes in 1976, and these new provisions improperly revive those courts. Nonetheless, the presence of
a special review provision is not egregious enough to reverse the presumption of the constitutionality of a federal statute, as hinted at by
Justice Scalia and Professor Garner.
II. THE FALL OF SPECIALIZED FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
A. Specialized Judges and Courts in the Federal Judiciary
The paradigmatic court in the United States federal system is the
District Court, one of general jurisdiction able to hear virtually all civil and criminal cases. The U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Supreme
Court can be similarly characterized as courts of general jurisdiction.
They are staffed by Article III judges, nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate for a lifetime appointment. While there
have been specialized federal courts throughout our history, they
have been particularly ascendant in the twentieth century. There are
now a large number of full-time specialized federal courts and judges,
covering a variety of administrative law topics or unique subject areas.
Most are staffed by judges appointed in a variety of ways outside of
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Article III, lacking the lifetime appointments mandated by that part
13
of the Constitution.
There are also some specialized courts staffed by Article III judges.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Inter14
national Trade are full-time courts consisting of Article III judges.
In addition, there are specialized courts convened on a temporary, ad
hoc basis, staffed by borrowed, generalist Article III judges serving in
15
other courts. The courts convened to hear constitutional challenges
to federal statutes, the main focus of this Article, are examples of the
latter.
Despite the great variety of specialized courts in the federal system
(and their counterparts at the state court level), there are common
rationales for their creation. These courts are said to possess virtues
unattainable by generalist courts. These virtues include that it is
more efficient to have one court and set of judges work on a particular topic, since judges familiar with that topic can dispose of cases
more rapidly and easier than the generalist judges. A related virtue is
that the quality of the judicial output is higher, since judges in those
courts are presumably experts and can be counted on to apply and
develop the law more coherently on a particular topic. Still another
virtue is uniformity. Generalist courts in different parts of the country may interpret federal law differently, and if litigation on that topic
is vested in one court, then the whole country will have the benefit of
16
dealing with one and only one judicial resolution of an issue.
Yet vices can also attend the creation of specialized courts. Judicial selection for such courts may become politicized by interest
groups concerned with their output, in ways usually not found in the
judicial selection of most generalist courts. Similarly, specialized
courts may be captured by a specialized bar for such cases, who may
interact frequently in and outside of court with the judges. Constant13

For overviews of these specialized federal courts, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 34–41 (6th ed. 2009);
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1111, 1111–13 (1990).
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 34–35 (discussing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade).
Revesz, supra note 13, at 1112 (discussing past and present examples of these courts, including the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, the Special Court for the Regional
Railroad Reorganization Act of 1973, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review).
For overviews of the benefits of specialized courts, see LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE
COURTS 32–34 (2011); Revesz, supra note 13, at 1116–17. But see Stefan Voigt, On the Optimal Number of Courts, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 49, 50–51 (2012) (discussing the costs of
having specialized courts and the benefits of multiple court heirarchies).
AND

14
15

16
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ly dealing with one area of law may become monotonous for the expert judges, and it is difficult to objectively measure if a specialized
court is issuing higher quality or more coherent decisions than a
17
generalist court dealing with the same cases.
B. The Three-Judge District Court as the Forum for Constitutional
Challenges, 1937–1976
The advent of the administrative state, the increasing number and
complexity of federal legislation, and increased caseloads in general
18
have driven the specialization of the federal judiciary. Yet constitutional litigation has resisted this trend toward specialization. That is,
with the exception of the three-judge district court for forty years of
the twentieth century, summarized below, there has not been a standing, specialized federal court to deal with constitutional litigation in
general or the constitutional challenges to federal statutes in particular.
Such an institution is not as unusual elsewhere in the world.
Many other nations have established a standing court for the specific
purpose of hearing constitutional challenges to legislation of the national government. Indeed, there has been an increasing trend toward greater use of this centralized method of judicial review, as
compared to the typically decentralized path of constitutional litiga19
tion in the United States. Support for “constitutional courts” in
20
other nations has a long pedigree, but they have become more popular in the post-World War II era due to several factors. New constitutions were adopted in many countries, often with bills of rights, that

17

18

19

20

For an overview of these vices, see BAUM, supra note 16, at 35–41; RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 249–58 (1996); Edward K. Cheng, The
Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 550–60 (2008); Voigt, supra note 16, at
51–52.
For an overview of the increasing specialization of the federal courts in the twentieth century, see JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 238-69 (2012).
See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816, 817 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012) (“For reasons to be discussed, the framers of new constitutions have been more attracted to the
‘centralized model’ of constitutional review, with a specialized [constitutional court] at its
core, than to the ‘decentralized (or American) model’ of judicial review exercised by the
judiciary as a whole.”); Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political and Judicial Audiences, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 539, 539 (2011)
(“Specialized constitutional courts have expanded all over the world in recent decades.”).
The earliest and most influential supporter in the mid-twentieth century for constitutional courts was Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen. See Sweet, supra note 19, at 817–19
(“The modern constitutional court, however, is largely the invention of Hans Kelsen.”).
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benefited from a judicial enforcement mechanism. A stand-alone
constitutional court could be easily added to existing judicial structures. Many countries were experimenting for the first time with
American-style judicial review, and constitutional courts dedicated to
that purpose were thought appropriate for the advancement and le21
gitimacy of that project.
But for the most part the United States has been reticent to establish a standing constitutional court. Part of the explanation is surely
the relatively recent practice, in historical terms, of the Supreme
Court regularly considering the constitutionality of federal statutes.
While that power of course traces back over two centuries to Marbury
22
v. Madison, for much of American history the Supreme Court has
not been hearing constitutional challenges to, much less stricken
down, congressional legislation. During most of the nineteenth century the Court rarely was asked to strike down, and rarely did strike
down, federal legislation as unconstitutional. That reticence eroded
in the late nineteenth century, and the erosion has continued to
23
But the present, three-tier
greater or lesser degrees since then.
24
structure of the generalist Article III courts was in place by 1891,
and it appears there was little if any discussion after that point about
creating specialized constitutional courts in the federal system.
That discussion revived in the 1930s during the Court’s storied
battle with President Franklin Roosevelt regarding the constitutionality of several important pieces of New Deal legislation. The President’s “court-packing” proposal had been largely framed in administrative terms, to enable the Supreme Court and the federal court
system to operate in a more efficient manner. The proposal to pack
21

22
23

24

See id. at 819–20 (discussing constitutional framers from various countries that model
their systems after those found in other countries). One recent study has concluded that
the adoption of such courts is best explained by domestic political considerations, namely, as a method where competitive political parties seek to safeguard their future interests.
They do this in the belief that the judiciary may protect constitutional values even when a
particular party lacks, at least periodically, the political power to do so. See generally Tom
Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?, 30 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 587 (2014).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
For overviews and data on the Supreme Court deciding constitutional challenges to congressional legislation, see LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 188–92 (5th ed. 2012) (publishing a table of “Supreme
Court Decisions Holding Acts of Congress Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part, 1789–
2009 Terms”); see generally, LINDA KAMP KEITH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF CONGRESS (2008).
This was as a result of the Evarts Act of 1891, creating the regional U.S. Courts of Appeals.
The present structure of regional district courts and appellate courts continued relatively
unchanged since then. FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 37–38.
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the Court by adding Justices spectacularly failed, but a relatively minor part of that package did pass Congress in 1937. It required that
all constitutional challenges be filed before a three-judge district
25
court with venue over the action. The judges of that court consisted
of the district judge before whom the case was originally filed, supplemented by at least one court of appeals judge, and typically another district judge, the latter two appointed by the Chief Judge of the
circuit within which the suit was brought. A direct appeal was possible to the Supreme Court; the Court ostensibly had to hear the appeal, as it was different from the discretionary certiorari jurisdiction
which covered almost all of the Court’s other cases.
The three-judge court concept was borrowed virtually unchanged
from the three-judge district court Congress established in 1910 to
hear constitutional challenges to, and particularly, to seek injunctive
relief against, state statutes. The 1910 law was a reaction to the then26
controversial Court decision in 1908 in Ex parte Young, in which the
Lochner Era Court struck down state Progressive Era legislation regulating railroad rates. What was especially noteworthy about Ex parte
Young was that the Court permitted the plaintiff railroad companies
to proactively seek injunctive relief in federal court, rather than wait
to raise the constitutional issue as a defense to an enforcement action
27
in state court. In reaction, Congress legislatively mandated that all
such actions, seeking injunctive relief on the asserted basis of the unconstitutionality of a state statute, be brought before a specially convened three-judge district court, with a direct appeal to the Supreme
28
Court. Supporters in Congress advanced several rationales for this
court to hear such matters. The striking down of a state statute on
these grounds was considered so significant that one federal judge,
standing alone, should not possess the power to do so. Instead, any
such decision would be better discussed and decided by three federal
judges, at least one of whom was a court of appeals judge, and perhaps even better received by the interested public. Whatever the decision of the three-judge district court, supporters also thought that a
prompt resolution of an important matter like the legality of a state
statute was necessary, and one way to ensure that would be to bypass

25
26
27

28

Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, 50 Stat. 752 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2282) (repealed 1976).
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
For a discussion of the jurisprudential significance of and the early congressional reaction
to Ex parte Young, see Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the
Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 104–18 (2008).
Act of June 19, 1910, § 266, 36 Stat. 1100 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281) (repealed 1976).
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the normal appeal to a court of appeals, and provide a direct path to
29
the Supreme Court.
In the years leading up to 1937, many federal laws challenged on
constitutional grounds were the subject of injunctions entered by
federal judges in lower courts, most on their way to review by the Supreme Court. As early as 1935 some members of Congress, “irri30
tat[ed]” by how some federal judges, sitting alone, had enjoined enforcement of what were perceived to be important federal statutes,
supported proposals to provide for prompt, direct appeals of such
decisions to the Supreme Court. These ideas led to the legislation in
1937, whose supporters argued that litigation attacking federal statutes should be of “equal dignity” to other suits covered by the threejudge district court and share in the presumed benefits of that
31
court.
Whatever the benefits of the three-judge district court to litigants,
32
particularly plaintiffs, many other influential observers eventually
concluded that they were outweighed by the administrative burdens
33
of the court. The criticisms were very similar for both aspects of the
29
30

31

32

33

For detailed discussion of the legislative background and intent of the 1910 Act, see Solimine, supra note 27, at 111–18.
Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms,
1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 617 (1938). There was a “voluminous outpouring”
of federal district court decisions holding various provisions of New Deal legislation unconstitutional and enjoining their application. Id. at 611. One of the leading Congressional critics of these decisions was then-Senator Hugo Black, who introduced legislation
in 1935 providing for direct appeals from district court decisions, though not for the convening of a three-judge district court. Id. at 612–13. The legislation proposed by Senator
Black did not pass. Id. at 613.
David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 11 (1964). For further discussion of the legislative history of the 1937 Act, see CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 17A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4234 at 194–95 (3d ed.
2007); Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 30, at 610–19; Solimine, supra note 27, at 124–25;
Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 561–63 (1960).
For example, plaintiffs in civil rights cases in the 1950s and 1960s saw benefits in litigating
cases before the court, particularly those brought in southern states. In many instances,
they thought, they were more likely to prevail before three judges than before a possibly
recalcitrant single judge. And they preferred a relatively quick appeal to what was perceived as a friendly tribunal (the Warren Court), as compared to the normal and longer
appeals process to a less certain fate in one of the courts of appeals. See Solimine, supra
note 27, at 125–31 (discussing “[t]he Three-Judge District Court and the Civil Rights
Movement”).
Concern over the administrative burdens of the court began to be expressed soon after its
jurisdiction was extended to attacks on federal statutes and only intensified later. See e.g.,
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941) (noting that the three-judge district
court “entails a serious drain upon the federal judieial system particularly in regions
where, despite modern facilities, distance still plays an important part in the effective administration of justice”).
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court, as it pertained to attacks on federal and state statutes. One
criticism was the administrative burdens placed on the lower courts.
Most cases then and now are litigated in the first instance before a
single district judge. Assembling three federal judges to sit as a trial
court was an awkward fit on several grounds. The busy schedules of
three otherwise separately-working judges had to be reconciled; trial
judges and at least one appeals judge, used to working separately, had
to work together; and three persons rather than just one had to per34
form the work typically done by one trial judge.
Another criticism concerned the caseload of the Supreme Court.
Normally the Court manages its discretionary docket through the writ
of certiorari, but direct appeals bypassed this process and ostensibly
required the Court to decide all such appeals on the merits. It deprived the Court of the possible benefit of consideration and sharpening of issues by at least one, and sometimes more than one, court
of appeals, as with all other cases. Nor was a direct appeal necessary
for rapid disposition, critics argued, since experience showed that
when necessary district and appellate judges could expeditiously decide cases and appeals. The Court ameliorated some of these problems by often summarily affirming (or occasionally reversing) such
appeals, as opposed to setting them for a full briefing and argument,
followed by a full opinion. But even with this safety valve, the Court
was deciding scores of appeals from three-judge district courts in the
1960s and 1970s, sometimes up to a third of all decisions rendered in
35
a Term.
36
37
By that time, prominent academic observers, think tanks, and
38
specially appointed committees were calling for the abolition of the
34

35

36
37
38

E.g., Currie, supra note 31, at 2, 74 (recognizing as a “prejudice” against provisions providing for three-judge district courts and direct appeal to the Supreme Court that
“[c]onsuming the energies of three judges to conduct one trial is prima facie an egregious waste of resources”); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON
THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 598-99 (1973)
[hereinafter FREUND REPORT].
E.g., AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 53,
318–25 (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY] (citing some cases that addressed three-judge
courts); FREUND REPORT, supra note 34, at 599–602. One problem raised by the summary
disposition practice was how much precedential weight they should be given by the Court
itself and lower courts. To this day the Court itself has been unclear on this matter. See
Solimine, supra note 27, at 135.
For example, Professor David Currie of the University of Chicago. See supra note 31.
For example, the American Law Institute. See supra note 35.
For example, the committee assembled under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center,
chaired by Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund, and including Professors Alexander Bickel (Yale Law School) and Charles Alan Wright (University of Texas Law School), among
others. See supra, note 34.
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thee-judge district court, as least as it pertained to constitutional attacks on federal statutes. This criticism was joined by prominent fed39
eral judges, not least of whom was Chief Justice Warren Burger. The
Judiciary Committees in both houses of Congress listened to their
40
pleas, held hearings and passed bills culminating in legislation en41
acted in 1976, which abolished the court as it pertained to attacks
on federal statutes. The legislation significantly curtailed its usage in
attacks on state practices, as it was only to be convened for reappor42
tionment cases. The 1937 experiment had come to end, and few
43
seemed to mourn its passing.

39

40
41
42

43

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary—1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049,
1053 (1972) (“We should totally eliminate the three-judge district courts that now disrupt
district and circuit judges' work.”).
For a detailed summary and examination of the consideration and passage of the 1976
Act, see WRIGHT, supra note 31, at § 4235; Solimine, supra note 27, at 134–48.
Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §
2284).
The critics of the three-judge district had allowed that it still might be appropriate for
particularly controversial cases raising federalism issues, and reapportionment cases were
listed as an example. See Solimine, supra note 27, at 137–38 (discussing views of Professor
Currie and of the ALI Report). That proposed exception was later considered by the Judiciary Committees, and it found its way into the final legislation. Id. at 144 (“The reports
of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees make clear that the drafters of those reports adopted almost all the arguments of the critics of the three-judge district court.”).
The principal reason for that exception was the then-controversial nature of reapportionment cases in federal court, initiated by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Id. at 144–
45 (“Also, reapportionment cases were, at the time, particularly controversial. Baker v.
Carr and legislative efforts to restrict it were probably fresh in the minds of many members of Congress.”). For discussions of litigation in three-judge district courts in reapportionment and related cases since 1976, see Michael E. Solimine, Congress, the Solicitor General, and the Path of Reapportionment Litigation, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1109, 1141–47
(2012) [hereinafter Solimine, Reapportionment]; Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79 (1996) [hereinafter Solimine, Three-Judge District Court]; see also Lisa Marshall Manheim, Redistricting Litigation and
the Delegation of Democratic Design, 93 B.U. L. REV. 563 (2013).
The remnant of the direct review statute, insofar as it did not apply to the remaining
three-judge district court jurisdiction, was repealed in 1988. See Act of June 27, 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. For a discussion of this, see 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 31, at § 4040. While proposals to repeal the direct review statute were discussed at
the same time as proposals to repeal the three-judge district court, the latter preceded
the former by twelve years. The principal reason for the delay was that early in the
Reagan Administration, proposals to repeal the direct review statute were coupled with
amendments to deprive the Supreme Court of any review over cases involving certain
controversial issues, such as school prayer. Such amendments were themselves so controversial that support for a simple repeal suffered. Eventually those amendments were
dropped and a straightforward repeal passed. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause
as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 970–76 (2013) (discussing the debates
over “the Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction” and their results).
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III. THE RISE OF STATUTES WITH SPECIALIZED CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW PROVISIONS
A. The New Provisions
Even before the 1976 repeal of the three-judge district court,
Congress was considering and enacting legislation that replicated, in
whole or in part, the repealed provision in the context of particular
statutes. And that process continued for an appreciable number of
statutes after the 1976 repeal. This Part of the Article will first provide an overview of those statutes and then summarize the legislative
history of the provisions.
One category of these statutes is those concerning the regulation
of fund-raising by various entities for political campaigns for federal
office. In the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA), Congress provided that the “national committee of any
political party,” or “any individual eligible to vote in any election for
the office of the President,” could file suit challenging the constitu44
tionality of the amendments in an appropriate federal district court.
The court was to “immediately” certify all constitutional questions to
the relevant court of appeals, which was directed to hear the appeal
45
en banc. That decision would be reviewed on direct appeal in the
Supreme Court. The legislation further admonished the federal
46
courts to hear and decide the cases expeditiously. Senator James
Buckley, a vocal opponent of the amendments, promptly brought suit
in the district court for the District of Columbia, and the indicated
provisions were utilized in the litigation that culminated in the land47
mark case of Buckley v. Valeo.
44
45
46

47

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 315(a), 88
Stat. 1285 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h).
Id.
Id. An earlier, related law, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971, established an exclusive mechanism for the FEC and others to “implement or construe” the
law. Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 563, 570 (1971) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §
9011 (b)(1)). Suit would be brought before a three-judge district court, with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(2)). The
statutory text did not specifically refer to a constitutional challenge, but such a challenge
was resolved through litigation under that provision. See Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512
F. Supp. 489, 490, 494 (D.D.C. 1980) (presiding as a three-judge court and analyzing the
constitutionality of the limits imposed by the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of
1971), aff’d, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). For further discussion of the passage of the amendments
and the procedural aspects of the Buckley v. Valeo case, see Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 771, 775 (2007) [hereinafter Solimine, Institutional].
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A similar but not identical pattern is found in the special review
48
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002,
mentioned at the outset of this Article, also known as the McCainFeingold law. Section 403 of the BCRA provides that any constitutional challenge must be brought before a three-judge district court
in the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal to the Supreme
49
Court, and in an expedited manner. It further provided that members of Congress had standing to challenge the law in court, or could
50
intervene in similar litigation brought by others. Intervention was
unnecessary, as then-Minority Leader Senator Mitch McConnell and
other members of Congress brought suit the day after the President
signed the BCRA, starting the process that culminated in the Su51
preme Court’s decision of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.
These provisions have also been used by other plaintiffs challenging
other aspects of the BCRA, which have resulted in additional cases lit52
igated in the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court, includ53
ing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
A second set of statutes do not fall into any particular subject area,
but can be categorized as legislation that at least some members of
Congress deemed important and would benefit from constitutional
challenges being litigated in the pattern found in the BCRA: exclusive review by a single judge or a three-district court, usually in the
48

49
50
51

52

53

Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). The BCRA thus amended the FECA, but established a different review mechanism for constitutional questions. Constitutional challenges to provisions of FECA remain under the procedure passed in 1974. See Wagner v.
FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1010–11, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (discussing the ways in
which constitutional challenges to FECA must be reviewed).
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 403(a).
Id. at § 403(b).
540 U.S. 93 (2003), aff’g in part, rev’g in part, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (threejudge court) (per curiam). For an overview of the procedural aspects of McConnell, see
Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 771–72, 776.
See, e.g., Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006), vacating 2004 WL
3622736 (D.D.C. 2004) (three-judge court); FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449 (2007), aff’g 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (three-judge court); Davis v. FEC, 554
U.S. 724 (2008), rev’g 501 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 2007) (three-judge court); Republican
Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010), aff’g 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010)
(three-judge court); Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012), aff’g 800 F. Supp. 2d 281
(D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court)); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), rev’g 893
F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court); James v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1806 (2014)
(per curiam), vacating and remanding 914 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court);
see also Nicholas Confessore, G.O.P. Sues for a Loophole to Raise Unlimited Money from Indihttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/us/politics/
viduals, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2014,
gop-sues-in-effort-to-raise-unlimited-cash-from-individuals.html?_r=0 (discussing the latest
suit against the BCRA, Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC).
558 U.S. 310 (2010). For the procedural history of the decision, see supra note 9.
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District of Columbia, followed by direct review in the Supreme
54
Court. These statutes include the Balanced Budget and Emergency
55
Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of 1985, the Cable
56
Television Consumer Protection and Decency Act of 1992, the
57
Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Telecommunications Act
58
59
of 1996, the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, and the census reform leg60
islation passed in 1998. Two other statutes similarly provided that a
constitutional challenge must be brought before a single district
judge in a district with appropriate venue, with a direct appeal and
certiorari jurisdiction, respectively, to the Supreme Court: the Flag
61
62
Protection Act of 1989, and the REAL ID Act of 2005.

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

These statutes were assembled in two ways, by consulting secondary sources which list examples of such laws, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 248–29 nn. 7–9, and conducting a computer search of the text of statutes and bills for the past six Congresses found at
www.thomas.gov, now www.congress.gov, for the words “constitutional” or “constitutionality.” I cannot guarantee that I have found every law that contains a special provision for
constitutional challenges, but I believe I account for many if not most of them.
Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274(a)(5), 99 Stat. 1037, 1098 (1985), applied in Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (holding the law unconstitutional), aff’g Synar v. United States,
626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (three-judge court).
Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 23, 106 Stat. 1460, 1500, applied in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 622 (1994) (remanding case for further proceedings), vacating 819 F. Supp.
32 (D.D.C. 1993) (three-judge court), and Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
225 (1997) (holding “must-carry” provisions constitutional), aff’g 910 F. Supp. 734
(D.D.C. 1995) (three-judge court).
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561, 110 Stat. 133, 142, applied in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885
(1997) (holding law that limited indecent material on internet unconstitutional), aff’g
929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)(three-judge court).
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561(a), 110 Stat. 56, 142, applied in United States v. Playboy Entm’t
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (holding that part of the law is unconstitutional as violating First Amendment), aff’g 30 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D.Del. 1998) (three-judge court).
Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 3, 110 Stat. 1200, 1211 (1996), applied in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.
811, 830 (1997) (establishing members of Congress did not have standing to challenge
law), vacating 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997), and Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 449 (1998) (holding line-item veto unconstitutional as violation of separation of
powers), aff’g 985 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1998).
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 209(e), 111 Stat. 2240, 2480, applied in
Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 320 (1999) (challenging constitutionality of sampling to generate census data since statute was interpreted not
to provide for sampling), aff’g Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(three-judge court) and U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 1998) (three-judge court).
Pub. L. No. 101-131, § 3, 103 Stat. 777, applied in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
312 (1990) (holding law unconstitutional), aff’g 731 F. Supp. 1123 (D.D.C. 1990) and
United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 311, construed in Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.
Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D.C. 2007) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss and rejecting the constitutional challenge), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 918 (2008).
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A third set of statutes can be collectively labeled as “Saxbe Fix”
laws. The term comes from controversy surrounding President Nixon’s nomination in 1973 of Senator William Saxbe to serve as Attorney General. Since Saxbe served in Congress while legislation passed
to increase the salary or benefits of the office to which he would be
appointed, it was argued that the appointment would violate the ob63
scure Emoluments Clause of the Constitution. The issue has come
up numerous times in American history, and the response has ranged
from nothing, to statutes which retroactively reduce any salary or
benefits flowing to the office of the new appointee, as occurred with
64
Attorney General Saxbe. Some have argued, however, that the retroactive fix does not cure an Emoluments Clause violation, and on at
least five occasions the legislation has provided a special review process for an anticipated constitutional attack. Four of those laws required that such a suit be brought before a three-judge district court
in the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal to the Supreme
65
Court. At least one other law set up the same process, but with no
66
requirement that it be brought in the District of Columbia.
Finally, it is worth noting that in recent years bills have been introduced in Congress which, in a variety of circumstances, establish
special review mechanisms for anticipated constitutional challenges
67
to the law, if enacted. Indeed, on one recent occasion the lack of
63
64
65

66

67

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.2.
For a history of the controversy, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1994).
For the appointment of Sen. Hillary Clinton to Secretary of State, see Pub. L. No. 110455, 122 Stat. 5036 (2008), applied in Rodearmel v. Clinton, 666 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125
(D.D.C. 2009) (three-judge court) (dismissing case for lack of standing), appeal dismissed,
130 S. Ct. 3384 (2010). For the appointment of Sen. Ken Salazar to the Secretary of the
Interior, see Pub. L. No. 111-1, 123 Stat. 3 (2009). For the appointment of Sen. Lloyd
Bentsen to Secretary of the Treasury, see Pub. L. No. 103-2, 107 Stat. 4 (1993). For the
appointment of Senator William Saxbe to Attorney General, see Pub. L. No. 93-178, 87
Stat. 697 (1973).
Act of Oct.12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 101(c), 93 Stat. 656, 657–58, applied in McClure
v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D. Idaho 1981) (three-judge court) (holding provision
granting standing to plaintiff Senator unconstitutional and thus not reaching merits),
aff’d, McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981). This provision was the result of opposition by Senator James McClure, Republican of Idaho, to the appointment of Democratic
Representative Abner Mikva of Illinois to the D.C. Circuit. See Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 42, at 133 n. 284 (discussing this case).
See, e.g., District of Columbia Equal Representation Act of 2013, H.R. 362, 113th Cong. § 7
(2013) (requiring constitutional challenge to be in the district court for the District of
Columbia with direct appeal on an expedited basis to the Supreme Court); Main Street
Fairness Act, S. 1452, 112th Cong. § 8 (2011) (requiring a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court from the district court, except without a requirement that such a suit be only
brought in the District of Columbia); District of Columbia Voting Rights Act of 2009, S.
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such a provision in a proposed law was a subject of controversy on the
floor of Congress. In response to the Citizens United decision, Democrats introduced the DISCLOSE Act, which among other things
would have strengthened disclosure requirements for campaign con68
tributions. It also provided that any constitutional challenge be filed
in the district court for the District of Columbia, with an appeal to a
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, combined with permission for members of Congress to file
such a suit and a mandate that the federal courts expeditiously re69
solve the case. Republican opponents in the House of Representatives denounced the omission of a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court, like that found in the BCRA. The omission, the opponents
charged, was “an effort to ensure that the Supreme Court would not
70
interpret the law before the 2010 elections.” The bill passed the
House but ultimately failed in the Senate.
B. Congressional Rationales
Several common themes are apparent in the passage of almost all
of the special review provisions. One characteristic is that the provisions were rarely the subject of extensive (or any) discussion during
the typically early stages of the legislative process (i.e., in committee
hearings or reports), and instead were added as late amendments, of71
ten on the floor of Congress before a final vote. The provisions
were often added to respond to eleventh-hour arguments that the
72
underlying laws were constitutionally suspect.

68
69
70
71
72

160, 111th Cong. § 8(a) (2009) (requiring any constitutional challenge to be brought in a
three-judge district court in the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court); Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 7022, 110th Cong. § 401 (2008) (appeal of “any
court ruling” on a constitutional challenge to the law “may be taken directly to the Supreme Court”); Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, S. 852, 109th Cong. §
305(c)(1) (2005) (requiring any constitutional challenge to be brought in a three-judge
district court in the District of Columbia, with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court); District of Columbia Student Opportunity Scholarship Act of 2002, S. 2866 107th Cong. § 12
(2002) (determining constitutional challenge would be in the district court for the District of Columbia, on an expedited basis with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court)
Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act, H.R. 5175,
111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter DISCLOSE Act].
Id. at § 401(a)(1)-(3).
Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 433,
476.
See Devins, supra note 12, at 442–43 (giving examples of statutes in which “the expedited
review provision was not part of the original bill”).
See id. (“[I]nstead, after constitutional objections were raised, Congress—rather than settle the issue itself—decided that it was best to hand the matter off to the Supreme
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To the extent the official record reveals putative motivations for
the special review provisions, they fall into two related categories.
First, there is a desire for swift resolution of any constitutional challenges in federal court to the underlying substantive law, and the
concern that the constitutionality of the law is not clear. This goal is
ostensibly advanced by the truncated two-step process, typically leaving out an appeal from the district court to the courts of appeals,
coupled with mandates that the Supreme Court hear an appeal, and
that all of the federal judges expeditiously resolve the case. Members
of Congress indicated that there was a need for swift resolution of any
court challenges, due to upcoming elections, the cost of implement73
ing the law, or similar reasons.
The second ground is concern over the constitutionality of the
law. This is related but separate from the desire to see that a constitutional litigation be promptly resolved. Some members of Congress
might be certain that the law is constitutional, but nonetheless concede that not everyone agrees and wish that any litigation by constitutional doubters be quickly resolved against the plaintiffs. That said,
the legislative history of the provisions in question indicates concerns
of constitutional uncertainty, rather than doubts of lawfulness or firm
convictions that the underlying law is constitutional. According to
most of these members of Congress, the conventional way to resolve
the constitutional question is to make it quicker and easier for federal
74
courts to resolve the issue.

73

74

Court.”); Panas, supra note 12, at 170–71 (illustrating how this happened in the Line Item
Veto Act).
Consider the following examples. On the 1974 Amendments to FECA, supra note 46, see
Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 772 (“Given their regulation of campaign finance
for presidential and other federal office elections, the drafters thought that a prompt
resolution of any legal challenge to these important statutes was desirable.”); Panas, supra
note 12, at 163–66 (discussing various rationales for expedited review provisions); Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1013–15 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (discussing the legislative purpose of FECA). On the costs of implementing the census sampling law in 1998,
see supra note 60 and 143 CONG. REC. H8227 (1997) (statement by Rep. Rogers). On the
need for prompt resolution of challenges to the changes in the budget procedures found
in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, supra note 55, see
H.R. REP. NO. 99–433, at 99–100 (1985) (Conf. Rep.); 131 CONG. REC. H9598 (daily ed.
Nov. 1, 1985) (statement of Rep. Duncan discussing the Act). And on the need to
promptly determine if the President could exercise the powers granted him by the Line
Item Veto Act, supra note 59, see 141 CONG. REC. S4243–44 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995)
(statements of Sens. Simon, Exon, and McCain); Devins & Fitts, supra note 12, at 357–58
(explaining that “congressional sponsors understood that the President would not have
an opportunity to make use of his item veto power until some time after the Supreme
Court's anticipated decision”).
Consider the following examples. On the Balanced Budget and Deficit Control Act of
1985, supra note 55, see 131 CONG. REC. H29050 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1985) (statement of
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There was not necessarily unanimous support for the provisions.
On several occasions the record reveals that some members opposed
the special review provisions or were skeptical of their efficacy. The
reasons included concerns that the provisions in effect called for the
75
federal courts to render advisory opinions, or that the constitutional
status of the underlying statute was not important enough to be the
76
subject of special treatment, as compared to other laws.
IV. THE DUBIOUS REVIVAL OF SPECIALIZED FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS
Certain aspects of the new special constitutional courts are themselves, surely constitutional. Congress has broad power to regulate
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and of the appellate juris77
diction of the Supreme Court. Replacing the usual three-step process for constitutional litigation with a different two-step process is
well within Congress’ discretion. More questionable but probably
still valid are the provisions that instruct the federal courts to decide
the constitutional challenges in an expeditious manner. One branch
of government telling another how to conduct its business raises separation of powers concerns. But most of the special review provisions
do not specify precise time periods within which federal courts must
78
act, and the language seems to be merely a recommendation. On
that understanding, the expediting language does not raise serious
79
constitutional concerns, and the Supreme Court seems little trou-

75

76

77
78
79

Rep. Lott). On the Communications Decency Act, supra note 57, see 142 CONG REC.
H1166 (1996) (statement of Rep. Berman). On the Line Item Veto, supra note 59, see
Devins, supra note 12, at 443 & n. 39 (discussing constitutional doubts strenuously raised
by Sen. Byrd); Panas, supra note 12, at 170–71 (same).
For example, on the Flag Protection Act, supra note 61, see 135 CONG. REC. S23161 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (“I am not happy with expedited review—
because it means that the Supreme Court will decide an important issue with no factual
context outside of a single case.”); on the census reform law, supra note 60, see 143
CONG. REC. H8227 (1997) (statement of Rep. Frank) (stating that the expedited review
provision improperly asks the Supreme Court to render an advisory opinion).
For example, on the Flag Protection Act, supra note 61, see 135 CONG. REC. S23137 (Oct.
4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“Is the issue important enough to warrant special
treatment? Then, I suppose, one may argue that the Congress should seriously consider
granting expedited review to cases arising from other worthy contexts such as civil rights,
abortion, religious liberty, death penalty.”).
FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 274–306.
Ryan, supra note 12, at 802–804
See id. at 799–810 (discussing constitutional considerations with regard to express and
precise statutory time limits); Panas, supra note 12, at 162–63 (discussing the constitutionality of expediting mandates).
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bled when it acknowledges in opinions that it is expediting treatment
80
of a particular case.
More problematic are other aspects of the special review provisions. Granting members of Congress standing to bring a constitutional challenge is, at least on its face, of doubtful validity. This was
81
made clear in Raines v. Byrd, in where the Court considered the special review provision of the Line Item Veto Act. As permitted by the
Act, members of Congress, in their individual capacity, brought the
82
suit, and the Court held that they lacked standing. Lower courts
had long struggled with the issue of whether members of Congress
possessed standing to challenge the validity of statutes or other governmental action, simply by virtue of their status as legislators, and
83
the Court had itself not been clear on the issue. The Court in Raines
did not purport to definitively resolve the issue, but it did hold that
the plaintiffs lacked an injury necessary to satisfy standing. The President had not yet exercised a veto under the Act, so the law at that
stage did not affect their votes on appropriation bills, or the lawmak84
ing process in general. Raines thus cast great doubt on an unqualified right of Congress to statutorily grant standing to its own mem85
bers simply by virtue of their holding office. Instead, the Court
seemed to permit such standing in those narrower instances where
legislative votes had been nullified in some way by the subsequent
86
governmental action which lawmakers were now challenging.
80

81
82
83
84
85
86

E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (“In obedience to the statutory
direction to allow a direct, expedited appeal to this Court . . . we promptly noted probable jurisdiction and expedited review . . . .”); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 817–18 (1997)
(“We established an expedited briefing schedule . . . .”).
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
Id. at 814-18
For an overview, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 122–23.
Raines, 521 U.S. at 824–28 (holding that precedent and “historical practice” work against
the appellees in this case).
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 13, at 123; Panas, supra note 12, at 159 (explaining the holding of Raines with regard to congressional standing).
See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 (comparing this case to Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437
(1939), which found that senators did have standing to challenge the bill at issue). The
Court’s recent decision in United States v. Windsor, 113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), offered little
clarification of this issue. There the President had declined to defend § 3 of the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, against a constitutional challenge
brought by a private party, but still enforced the law. Windsor, 113 S. Ct. at 2683–84. The
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives voted to intervene to defend the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 2684. The majority of the Court
held that the United States had standing to pursue the appeal, and did not directly address whether BLAG had standing. Id. at 2684–89. The majority did not mention Raines,
but it was discussed by two of the dissenting opinions. Justice Scalia argued that the reasoning, if not the holding, of Raines suggests there was no standing over this dispute be-
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As, if not more, interesting and important than these constitutional questions are institutional ones. Are the professed reasons for
special constitutional courts—speed and resolving uncertain constitutional questions—well-served by the provisions? What about the majority of federal statutes that do not have such provisions? Do the
provisions, including the added symbolism of three judges sitting at
the trial level, best serve the institutional responsibilities of Congress,
and of federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, adjudicating the constitutionality of federal statutes? These questions are explored in the balance of this Part. I conclude that while
these provisions do not deserve the sharp criticism of some commentators, they are nonetheless on balance largely unnecessary, and in
some ways can be counterproductive, and should not be enacted by
Congress.
A. Institutional Responsibilities of Congress
1. Congressional Delegation to the Courts
Recent scholarship has identified a principal defect of special constitutional court provisions. They are evidence, critics argue, that
Congress in recent decades has not discharged its historic responsibility of taking seriously its obligation to carefully consider the constitutionality of statutes it passes. One prominent critic, Neal Devins,
contends that recently, Congress is often “indifferent” to the constitutionality of statutes it passes, or “treats the Constitution as the exclu87
sive province of the Supreme Court . . . .” Special review provisions,
he continues, “delegate Congress’s power to interpret the Constitution to the Supreme Court,” and Congress thereby “signals the Court

87

tween the legislative and executive branches on the constitutionality of DOMA. Id. at
2703 n.3, 2704 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Alito, in contrast, allowed that whether
BLAG had standing was a “difficult question,” id. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting), but that
Raines did not prevent standing, for two reasons. That case, he argued, dealt with individual members of Congress, as opposed to one of the legislative branches acting collectively, and they “were not the pivotal figures whose votes would have caused the Act [in
question in Raines] to fail absent some challenged action.” Id. at 2714. It bears emphasis
that DOMA had no special review provision, much less any language authorizing Congress as a whole or any individual members to sue to challenge the constitutionality of the
law. For discussions of standing by Congress and its members in light of Windsor, see Tara
Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1311 (2014).
Devins, supra note 12, at 442.
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that it has little institutional stake in constitutional matters.”88 Other
critics argue that some members of Congress may enthusiastically
embrace the delegation evidenced by special review provisions, as it
“enable[s] skeptical legislators to hold their noses and vote for popular bills that they opposed on constitutional or even partisan
89
grounds.”
Devins does not rely merely on anecdotal evidence to support these charges, but rather has extensively documented the seeming indifference of Congress in recent decades to constitutional issues. In a
recent study of congressional hearings from 1970 to 2010, he demonstrated that hearings on constitutional issues had fallen in both
chambers of Congress (principally in the respective judiciary commit90
tees) since 1990. He attributed the decline largely to increased party polarization, the weakening of committee influence, and an in91
crease in posturing by members of Congress. More recently, Devins
argued that Congress’ deliberation over the Affordable Care Act was
a case study of this phenomenon, as “congressional committees paid
virtually no attention to constitutional questions [about the Act] in
92
hearings or committee reports.”
These criticisms of the special constitutional review provisions are
not without relevance or force, but I think they belie a more complicated story of their passage by Congress and effect on the courts.
Consider the Affordable Care Act. Despite apparent congressional
indifference to constitutional issues before its passage, there was no
special review provision in the law and, so far as I can tell, there was
93
no serious discussion of adding such a provision. This suggests that
88

89

90
91
92
93

Id. at 442–43. Devins gave the enactment of the Line Item Veto Act as an example, id. at
443–44, and added that “[t]he Justices almost always invalidate congressional statutes that
contain expedited review provisions.” Id. at 444.
Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution to the Courts: Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy,
117 YALE L.J. 886, 897 (2008). The author gave congressional passage of the BCRA as an
example. Id. See also Panas, supra note 12, at 170–72 (making arguments similar to
Devins and Greene).
Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of Constitutional
Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 741–53 (2011) (summarizing findings).
Id. at 782–83.
Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution When Enacting the Affordable
Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 261, 270 (2012).
The issue goes unmentioned in Devins, id., and in other sources discussing the legislative
history of, and constitutional doubts (mainly under the Commerce Clause) raised inside
and outside of Congress during debate over, the ACA. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE
TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM 72–90 (2013)
(discussing “the constitutional limits that the ACA supposedly transgressed” and arguing
that “scholars and judges worked hard to massage and improve them, but they never succeeded in answering obvious difficulties”). On the other hand, to the extent that the
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the creation story of the special review provisions is a more complicated one and not entirely dependent on justifiable criticisms of the
lack of congressional deliberations on the constitutionality of proposed statutes. A richer and more complicated narrative would not
only include the presence or absence of such constitutional discourse
in the legislature, but also such related factors as rational actions by
Congress to advance policy goals, ordinary deal-making when statutes
94
are passed, and interest group activity, among other things.
2. Congressional Cooperation with the Courts
It is one thing when Congress passes a statute with no, or virtually
no, discussion of its constitutionality, much less of any special judicial
review provision it may have (or no discussion of whether such a provision is appropriate, for the many statutes that do not have them).
But there was some seemingly genuine discussion of constitutional
issues in other statutes, if mainly on the floor of Congress before a fi95
nal vote, with the Line Item Veto Act being a good example. Congress undeniably can send signals to the federal courts when it enacts
96
statutes and in other ways. Rather than evidence of abdication of
responsibilities, the presence of a special review provision can be
conceptualized as a signal to the federal courts that the matter is a serious one that ought to be undertaken with sufficient gravity by the
third branch of government. That is, it can be viewed as a heightened awareness by Congress that there are serious constitutional is-

94

95
96

supporters of the ACA took seriously the constitutional objections, perhaps they did not
want any likely legal challenge to be facilitated or accelerated by a special review provision.
See BAUM, supra note 16, at 42–46 (discussing these and other reasons for creation of specialized courts in general); CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DESIGNING JUDICIAL REVIEW: INTEREST
GROUPS, CONGRESS, AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 15–33 (1997) (attributing design of
judicial review provisions in part to interest groups affected by the statute in question);
Alon Cohen, Independent Judicial Review: A Blessing in Disguise, 37 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
209, 209–10 (2014) (arguing that providing for independent judicial review may be a device to enable politicians to destabilize a law they oppose).
See supra note 74.
See, e.g., Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53
AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 971 (2009) (examining how Court-curbing legislation proposed in
Congress between 1877 and 2006 influenced the rate of the Supreme Court striking down
federal statutes as unconstitutional); Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV.
914, 919 (2012) (discussing how Congress can exert influence over the judiciary); Eugenia Froedge Toma, Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling
Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (1991) (discussing how Congress uses budgets to signal
intent).
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sues at play, coupled with an arguably genuine concern that certain
factors make a prompt resolution of the issue appropriate.
The modern special review provisions can be usefully compared to
the expansion of the jurisdiction of the three-judge district court in
97
It
1937 to include constitutional challenges to federal statutes.
might seem odd that Congress at that time would put federal statutes
on a speedier path toward review by a Supreme Court which had
shown little hesitation to strike down New Deal legislation. Several
factors explain the incongruity. The three-judge court provision was
mainly intended to forestall the actions of district judges acting alone,
some of whom (at least in the minds of Congress) had issued opin98
More
ions exhibiting overt hostility toward New Deal statutes.
broadly, the amount of sustained attention Congress gave to the con99
stitutional basis of early New Deal legislation seems limited. Rather
than reflecting a clear congressional judgment on constitutional issues, the 1937 expansion was primarily intended as a yoke on some
federal judges in the lower courts perceived to be hostile to the New
Deal. Thus, the 1937 expansion was not predicated on constitutional
doubts expressed in Congress, but rather on a general belief in the
validity of that legislation and to avoid the binding (if temporary) ef100
Contrary to Justice
fect of the decisions of single district judges.
97
98

99

100

See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text.
Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 30, at 617–18 (“[T]he inevitable irritation of Congress at
the free-handed way in which single judges throughout the country enjoined the enforcement of some of the most vital measures ever enacted, made inevitable the requirement of Section 3 for a court of three judges to set aside the will of Congress.”).
See JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 43
(2010) (discussing the fact that legislation during this period was not given much attention). While the causes and consequences of the 1937 Court-packing plan remains the
subject of scholarly debate, see, e.g., Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and
the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052, 1052 (2005) (discussing cases from this era), there
is common consensus that much early New Deal legislation was hurriedly drafted, with little consideration to the constitutional basis for the laws. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 79, 81 (1998) (discussing
Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act of 1934 and noting that some believed it was rushed
into legislation); Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
244, 251 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995) and giving examples of legislation from this period that was quickly and poorly drafted). By contrast,
Congressional attention to that issue became greater once the Court began striking down
legislation passed early in the New Deal. See, e.g., DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND
THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 163–83 (1966) (discussing congressional
consideration and discussion of constitutional basis for the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); Cushman, supra note 95, at 81–90 (discussing the drafting of various
laws during the second New Deal).
While congressional support for FDR’s court-packing plan eroded in the spring and
summer of 1937, it does not follow that majorities in Congress were expressing doubts
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Scalia and Professor Garner, then, enactment of a standing or particular special review provision is not inexorably evidence of constitutional doubts in Congress.
The seriousness of purpose can also be reflected by the other typical features of special review provisions. Permitting members of
Congress themselves to initiate or to intervene in the anticipated litigation highlights the equal and complimentary footing one branch
has with the other. For the past several decades the appellate judges
in the District of Columbia Circuit have often been regarded in many
quarters as the second-most prestigious and important federal court.
This is due to the perceived high quality of the federal judges serving
in the District, the appeals of important agency and other administrative actions exclusively vested in the District, and the fact that many
101
Supreme Court Justices have previously served on the D.C. Circuit.
Placing exclusive venue of special constitutional litigation in the Circuit (recall that three-judge district courts have at least one circuit
judge) might be said to underline the importance Congress wishes to
give these proceedings. All these factors can be said to resemble a dialogue between Congress and the Court, which scholars have advanced as descriptive of and normatively preferable to the relation102
ship between Congress and the Supreme Court.

101

102

about the constitutionality of New Deal legislation. Also, passage of the 1937 expansion
took place on August 24 of that year, after the plan had been abandoned and the controversy subsided. Indeed, by that point the Court had begun upholding New Deal legislation, and the expansion makes even more sense as an effort to rein in possibly hostile district judges sitting alone and to expedite appeals to a now more friendly Supreme Court.
See SHESOL, supra note 99, at 516; Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 30, at 610 (observing
the fear “[t]hat the fate of acts of Congress should depend, even temporarily, upon the
view of a single judge”). Cf. Michael P. Foradas, Comment, Section 1252: A Jurisdictional
Dinosaur, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 175, 177–78 (1980) (discussing relationship or lack thereof
between the Court-packing plan and the expansion of the three-judge district court).
See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT 7–19 (1999)
(discussing the rise of the DC Circuit); LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
RATIONAL CHOICE 351 (2013) (pointing out that DC Circuit judges are disproportionately
considered for the Supreme Court); Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit,
23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 131 (2013) (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s unique reputation); John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA.
L. REV. 375, 375 (2006) (discussing the differences between the D.C. Circuit and other
circuit courts); Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United
States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (2005) (exploring the reputations
of some courts of appeals, including the D.C. Circuit).
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1990) (offering “a view of federal jurisdiction in which
the boundaries of authority are far less clear than commentary suggests, and in which the
contours of federal jurisdiction are resolved as the result of an interactive process be
ween Congress and the Court on the appropriate uses and bounds of the federal judicial
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At least some of the special review provisions might be viewed,
again, not as abdication of congressional responsibilities, but rather
as the product of the rather ordinary process of the passage of most
statutes and the compromise and deal-making process that often attends that passage. The provisions in recent election law statutes
provide a good example. There is some evidence that the special judicial review provisions of the 1974 amendments to FECA were due to
an explicit or implicit compromise between the proponents and opponents of the law. Constitutional questions had been discussed in
the legislative debates, and there is some suggestion that both supporters and opponents anticipated a constitutional challenge, and
103
The
each side was betting that courts would uphold their views.
regular cycle of elections and the planning for campaigns elevates the
104
need for rapidity and resolution of constitutional challenges. Perhaps they also thought that the federal judges in the District, not beholden to the political and legal culture of particular states, might be
more sophisticated about politics and more likely to uphold the
105
law. On the other hand, the language permitting members of Congress to sue arguably removed doubts about the standing of legislators, and seemingly made a constitutional attack easier. Similar rea106
sons might account for the special review provisions of the BCRA.

103

104
105

106

power”); Devins & Fitts, supra note 12, at 359 (“Just as the Court informs Congress about
the meaning of the Constitution, Congress too should educate the Court.”). Since the
1990s, increasing polarization between the parties in Congress, and apparent conflict at
times between Congress as a whole and the Court, has led some observers to conclude
that the dialogue is moribund. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013) (“Although
political polarization has benefitted the Supreme Court's power relative to Congress in
the short term, the longer-term power relations are more uncertain.”). But see Matthew
R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1318–25 (2014) (arguing that
overrides of statutory overrides are more prevalent than sometimes recognized and may
be so in the future).
See Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 774–75 (“Yet, the very existence of the provision suggests that (some of) the drafters and their supporters wished to facilitate a court
challenge.”); Rebecca Curry, Making Law with Lawsuits: Understanding Judicial Review in
Campaign Finance Policy, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 389, 419–27 (2013) (“Among a certain faction of FECA's authors, there is ample evidence of an attempt to kill the law with constitutionalism.”).
See Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (discussing this
need in light of the repetition of elections).
See Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 773 (“Perhaps the supporters thought a federal district court in the District of Columbia would, all things being equal, possess more legal acumen and political sophistication than federal judges elsewhere . . . .”).
See Douglas, supra note 70, at 468–69; Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 773–75
(noting the “various reasons” that “special review provisions may have been an implicit
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Some of the other special review provisions discussed earlier might
also be characterized as the product of legislative compromise.
I am not suggesting that these alternative rationales are preferable
to the more cynical ones advanced by Justice Scalia and other critics
of special review provisions. Rather, my point is that a fuller appreciation of the reasons driving congressional behavior suggests that the
special review provisions are not devoid of some arguably sound rationales. Nonetheless, I believe these provisions do not reflect sound
policy. The principal reasons I reach this conclusion are found in the
next Subsection of this Part.
B. Institutional Effects on the Courts
107
As noted above, the demise of the standing three-judge court
district to adjudicate constitutional challenges to federal statutes was
largely due to opposition from the Supreme Court and its allies. The
opposition was based on the asserted deleterious effects on the operation of the federal courts. Critics argued that it was administratively
burdensome to assemble such courts, that direct appeals to the Supreme Court burdened the usual discretionary docket control, and
108
that ultimately the special process was unnecessary. To be sure, the
special review provisions addressed in this Article do not duplicate
the standing court repealed in 1976. The newer provisions are attached to a relatively few specific statutes. Nonetheless, they share
some of the same characteristics as the three-judge district court as it
existed before the 1976 repeal, and often have some aspects (e.g., exclusive jurisdiction in the District Court for the District of Columbia)
109
The demise of the older court, and
not found in the prior court.
the purported benefits of the usual way of litigating challenges to
most federal statutes, provide useful markers to examine the effects
of the new constitutional review provisions.

1. Specialization and Percolation
Recall that the repealed three-judge district court for challenging
federal statutes was an amendment to the then-existing court used to
adjudicate challenges to state statutes. Many of the criticisms ultimately launched against the latter applied with equal force to the

107
108
109

part of the legislative deal that culminated in passage of the BCRA”); Panas, supra note
12, at 164 (referencing FECA).
See supra Part II.
Solimine, supra note 272727, at 134–44.
Solimine, supra note 272727, at 148–49.
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former. Consider vesting a constitutional challenge to a federal statute in a specialized court, as opposed to other issues, such as cases
raising interpretation, application or enforcement of the statute.
Specialized courts for what are regarded as particularly unique or
110
complicated areas of law (e.g., patent or taxes) may be beneficial.
But constitutional issues, as such, do not seem to fall into that category. While the statutes themselves may sometimes be complicated, the
constitutional provisions at issue are not. Indeed, the problem is often that the constitutional language is open-ended and raises issues
and requires decision-making that resembles the overtly political and
111
policy judgments of the non-judicial branches of government. This
is of course not to say that constitutional litigation is not complex and
complicated compared to other cases typically litigated in federal
courts. Nonetheless, whatever else might be said about the resolution
of constitutional cases, not the least of which is the debate over interpretative methodologies to cabin judicial (and particularly Supreme
Court) discretion, there seems no strong reason to assemble a special
group of judges to make such decisions at the trial level.
All of the new provisions have a direct appeal of the trial court decision to the Supreme Court, different from the ordinary discretion112
ary certiorari jurisdiction. A direct appeal, which ostensibly must be
110

111

112

Specialized courts in the federal system have not been without controversy, as not having
served their intended goals. For example, the jury is still out on the establishment of the
Federal Circuit in 1982 as the one appellate court for (among other things) patent litigation. Some scholars argue that the Federal Circuit has not delivered on its promise to
provide uniformity and stability in patent law. Circuit splits on patent issues have disappeared, but the Supreme Court has increasingly taken an active role in reviewing, and
sometimes reversing, the patent decisions of the Federal Circuit. For overviews of the debate, see BAUM, supra note 16, at 181–86; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and
Coherent Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505 (2013); John M.
Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized
Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553 (2010); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal
Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1802–03 (2013). Some have argued that returning
patent issues to circuit percolation, or even to state courts, might be advisable. See, e.g.,
Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 16 (challenging “the assumptions that legal uniformity and patent-specific expertise justify excluding state courts
from hearing patent cases”); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2007) (finding fault in “the Federal
Circuit's exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases”).
See Richard A. Posner, A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 39–40 (2005) (exploring
whether courts should be considered political bodies when deciding constitutional questions).
Congress acted twice to repeal the former direct appeal: in 1976 to eliminate the threejudge district court to hear constitutional challenges to federal statutes, which also eliminated the direct appeal associated with those courts, and in 1988 to eliminate a direct appeal from any district court decision holding a federal statute unconstitutional. See supra
Part II.
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decided by the Court, deprives the Court of the benefit of a decision
by a court of appeals, but also of the views of other federal courts
across the country which may have ruled on the issue. In a direct appeal, only three judges (and sometimes only one, depending on the
statute) will have considered the matter, while in ordinary litigation
and appeals potentially a score or more of federal judges may have
done so before it reaches the Court. The phenomenon of the percolation of issues in the lower courts, before Supreme Court review, has
113
generated a large commentary. Proponents of percolation, on and
114
off the Court, argue that the Court (and the federal court system as
a whole) benefits from the potential diversity of views generated by
different jurists in different courts rulings on an issue. Such percolation may aid the Court in deciding whether to review an issue at all,
in reaching a more informed final decision once it decides to resolve
a split in authority, and by encouraging lower court judges to take
their jobs more seriously, knowing that their work may aid in developing the law. Proponents argue that the benefits of percolation are
particularly important in constitutional cases, since there Congress
has fewer options to respond, as opposed to cases involving what
115
Congress sees as an errant decision of statutory interpretation.
Proponents are thus particularly skeptical of most specialized
116
courts, and presumably would be skeptical of the new specialized
review provisions.
117
118
Critics of percolation are found on and off the Court as well.
They contend that the putative benefits are overstated. Some point
113

114

115

116

117

E.g., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (“In my [Justice Stevens] judgment it
is a sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various States to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court”).
E.g., POSNER, supra note 17, at 263–64; Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1567, 1573 (2008) (questioning whether judicial uniformity is a valuable goal); Doni
Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 481–94 (2012) (suggesting “the need for a new approach to
lower court constitutionalism, one that recognizes the full set of normative values advanced by an interpretive system that empowers lower courts to make choices about constitutional meaning”).
E.g., Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 633–34 (1989) (arguing that percolation
“has its greatest force in relation to constitutional questions”).
E.g., Revesz, supra note 13, at 1155–59 (analyzing “a set of arguments that generally counsel against the creation of specialized courts that are not subject to review in the generalist courts of appeals”).
E.g., Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1986) (“And to go further and suggest that it is actually desirable to allow important questions of federal law to ‘percolate’ in the lower courts for a few years before
the Supreme Court takes them on seems to me a very strange suggestion; at best it is making a virtue of necessity.”).
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out that delaying a definitive resolution while an issue plays out in the
lower courts is unfair to the litigant who happened to be before the
119
Others argue that percolation
court that ruled the incorrect way.
perpetuates uncertainty and non-uniformity in the law, especially
problematic when it comes to the interpretation of constitutional
120
rights which ostensibly apply equally across the nation. Still others
contend that the Supreme Court rarely internalizes the benefits of
percolation. While the Court may refer to a circuit split in an opinion mentioning why it granted certiorari, it appears, critics argue,
that the Court rarely relies on the analysis developed by lower courts
121
when fashioning its final decision. The critics would presumably be
less skeptical of a special review provision which bypasses any percolation in the lower courts.
How do these critiques apply to the special review statutes? Does
the Court resolve appeals from cases not involving such provisions in
a better or more informed way than cases on direct appeal? It is difficult to say, since the quality of a Supreme Court decision is much in
the eye of a beholder; objective indicia of opinion quality are notoriously difficult to apply. Doctrinal reliance by the Court on lower
court opinions grappling with the merits is one way to measure the
118

119

120
121

E.g., Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 690
(1990) (arguing that “[w]hether or not percolation works—and how well it works—are
matters of accident”); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and
the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1160–85 (2012) (examining “the difficulties
presented by” circuit splits, particularly in the Fourth Circuit).
See, e.g., Bator, supra note 118, at 689 (“[W]e must always remember that perpetuating
uncertainty and instability during a process of percolation exacts important and painful
costs. Of course, law professors and appellate judges do not pay these costs. It is the citizens and firms whose affairs are confounded and prejudiced by uncertainty and instability
in the law who pay the price.”); Rehnquist, supra note 117, at 11 (“It is of little solace to
the litigant who lost years ago in a court of appeals decision to learn that his case was part
of the ‘percolation’ process which ultimately allowed the Supreme Court to vindicate his
position.”).
See, e.g., Logan, supra note 118, at 1171–74 (arguing that “[a]llowing such variation is a
recipe for public disillusionment over the authoritativeness of national institutions”).
See, e.g., Bator, supra note 118, at 690 (questioning whether “the Supreme Court Justices
and law clerks read” lower court opinions); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction:
The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1994)
(“I question whether inferior court judgments significantly influence ultimate Supreme
Court rulings very often.”); Henry J. Friendly, The “Law of the Circuit” and All That: Foreword to the Second Circuit 1970 Term, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 406, 407 (1972) (“If a case involves questions of federal law of such importance as to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court, the views of the court of appeals count, and should count, for little.”). The Court
has also been unclear and inconsistent about what deferential weight, if any, it gives to
the numbers of circuits on each side of a circuit split. For a discussion of this, see AaronAndrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 853-856 (2014)
(questioning the weight that should be given to unbalanced circuit decisions).
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efficacy of percolation or its absence. Some empirical studies suggest
122
For a very small rethat this rarely occurs in the Supreme Court.
cent sample, contrast NFIB v. Sebelius and Citizens United. Recall that
there was a circuit split in the former case. There was some modest
123
reference in the majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts,
and in the concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Ruth Gins124
burg, to the lower court opinions to support their analyses. By contrast, none of the opinions in Citizens United relied in any substantive
way on the analysis of the lower court opinion, save for a few fleeting
125
references to the facts of or the record in the case.
Definitively drawing the conclusion that the Court rarely relies on
lower court opinions in its analysis when there are circuit splits, and
rarer still when it decides cases on direct appeal, awaits further empirical study. What can be said at this point is that there seem very few
occasions in direct appeals, as compared to circuit splits, for the
Court to gain the advantage of discerning how more than one lower
court considered and resolved an issue. While it is true that the
Court rarely expressly acknowledges that advantage, even in cases
with circuit splits, some empirical research indicates that the Court
takes into account the presence or absence of a circuit split when de122

123

124

125

E.g., Logan, supra note 118, at 1167–68 (publishing study of 138 Fourth Amendment decisions in the Supreme Court from 1981 to 2010 Terms, which demonstrates the Court
rarely mentioned the existence of a circuit split and rarely utilized circuit court opinions
to develop the doctrine resolving the case).
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012) (citing and abrogating
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, , 551 (6th Cir. 2011)); id. at 2588 (citing Seven-Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 14–15 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
Id. at 2620–22 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Thomas
More, 651 F.3d at 561, 565 (Sutton, J., concurring in part) and Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 16).
The joint opinion of four Justices dissenting did not cite a lower court opinion.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 322–23 (2010) (citations to lower court opinion
for procedural history purposes). Perhaps a better comparison would be to the precursor
to Citizens United, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The former case was mainly considering whether to reverse the latter, and the lower court understandably did not consider that issue. In contrast, in the latter case the BCRA had just been passed, and a host
of new factual and legal issues was confronting both the three-judge panel and the Supreme Court. The Court in McConnell made frequent reference to the lower court decision regarding the record in the case and the factual findings made below. E.g., id. at
124–29, 146–51, 175–76; id. at 301–04 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). At several points the
Court also arguably adopted or relied in part on the legal analysis of the district court, as
evidenced by citations to the lower court opinions. E.g., id. at 167–68, 193, 197 (discussing issues that were undisputed or agreed upon by all the lower court judges, or quoting
the lower court extensively). In its most recent BCRA decision, the Court made only brief
reference to the analysis of the court below. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1455
(2014) (describing this analysis in only a few sentences). Cf. id. at 1481–84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing extensive quotations from district court opinion in McConnell in Appendix A to the opinion).
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ciding whether to review a case, and if so, resolving it on the merits.
In the latter circumstance, the Court will often (whether it acknowl126
edges it or not) take the side of the majority of the circuits in a split.
The existence of a circuit split may also inform the selection of cases
127
128
for review, and perhaps even the drafting of an opinion, even
when not expressly mentioned in the opinion. These benefits, modest though they may be when there are circuit splits, seem practically
129
nonexistent when there are direct appeals.
A related (if imperfect) way to measure the quality of lower court
130
opinions is the rate of reversal on appeal. On that score, the feder126

127
128

129

130

See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on
Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 135, 135
(2006) (studying 338 Supreme Court decisions from the 1985–1995 Terms, where certiorari was granted to resolve a circuit split, and showing that the Court was more likely to
adopt the position of a majority of the circuits); see also Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower Courts: An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 J.
POL. 150, 150 (2013) (arguing the Court faces a strategic tradeoff between allowing a
conflict to continue to gain information, and ending the conflict by grating review, and in
study using data from Lindquist & Klein article found that review is typically granted only
after a conflict persists).
Gewirtzman, supra note 114, at 493–94.
Cf. Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. Collins Jr. & Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J. POL. 31, 31 (2011) (publishing study of Supreme Court
majority opinions in 2002–2004 Terms, using plagiarism software, that showed the Court
systematically incorporated language from lower court opinions).
Depending on the length and number of opinions in the lower court, and particularly if
it is a three-judge district court, there might be some similarities to full percolation. For
example, in McConnell all three judges on the lower court issued their own lengthy opinions, in addition to the per curiam opinion of that court, and the three separate opinions
take up over 800 pages in the official reports. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176–
919 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Solimine, supra note 47, at 776–77 (discussing these opinions).
But this is an exception to the ordinary opinion generation that has occurred in cases
with special review provisions. Cf. Ryan Stephenson, Note, Federal Circuit Case Selection at
the Supreme Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 286–87 (2013) (suggesting that
for case selection by the Supreme Court, dissents in the Federal Circuit are substitutes for
circuit splits that ordinarily occur in non-patent cases).
On the other hand, a procedural quirk of three-judge district court litigation, with
direct review, can deprive that litigation of even modest information to the Court about
circuit court opinion on issues. There is not a circuit split as such, but rather a split of authority among three-judge district courts about how much precedential weight, if any,
such courts should give to the opinions of the circuits in which they sit. Since three-judge
district court opinions are not reviewed by the court of appeals, some argue that it is inappropriate for the former court to be bound by the decisions of the latter. The contrasting, and apparently majority view seems to be that such courts should give such
weight to circuit authority, although most courts seem to do it without extensive discussion of the issue. For discussion, compare Parker v. Ohio, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1105
(S.D. Ohio 2003) (three-judge court) (stating that it is bound by circuit decisions) with id.
at 1112 n.3 (Gwin, J., concurring) (questioning this assumption).
See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 518, 519 (2011) (making arguments
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al district court decisions rendered under the special review provisions addressed in this Article do comparatively well. Of the twentytwo lower court decisions appealed to the Supreme Court, fourteen,
131
or 64%, were affirmed by only an opinion or in a summary fashion.
Given that the historic reversal rate of the Supreme Court in all cases
is about 50%, this suggests that the specialized trial courts are getting
132
it right more often than not. On the other hand, the direct appeals
mandated by the special review provisions present a skewed sample of
cases, unlike the other cases on the Court’s docket, which it assembles by way of the discretionary writ of certiorari.
2. Exclusive Jurisdiction in the District of Columbia Circuit
Many of the special review provisions vest exclusive jurisdiction of
constitutional challenges in a three-judge district court in the District
of Columbia, followed by a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. As
133
previously observed, the federal courts in the District possess jurisdiction beyond the civil and criminal matters that arise from people
living and working there. In addition, Congress has vested exclusive
or permissible jurisdiction in those district courts and the appellate
court over a wide range of challenges to the administrative decisions
of the federal government, and of appeals from federal agency deci134
sions. This is true no matter in what other state or states the underlying controversy arises. The expertise and sophistication of the fed-

131

132

133
134

about reversal rates based on the types of circuits in which judges sit); Jonathan Remy
Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived
Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745 (2008) (publishing data on “affirmance
rates in and citation rates to appellate bankruptcy opinions” and making arguments
about the quality of those decisions).
The number and percentage of affirmances rises to 15% and 65%, respectively, if we include one decision that was affirmed in part and reversed in part. If we further exclude
one appeal that was dismissed, there are nineteen lower court decisions with an affirmance rate of 79%. Four lower court decisions were reversed or vacated. In these calculations, I exclude one case where certiorari was denied. For the lower court decisions and
the disposition (if any) by the Supreme Court that are the bases for these calculations, see
supra notes 46–66 & accompanying text.
On the historic reversal in the Supreme Court for all cases, see EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at
729–35 (setting out affirmance and reversal rates of decisions from the U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts from 1946 to 2009 Terms).
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Many statutes place exclusive review of agency decisions or other matters in the district
court or in the D.C. Circuit. Other provisions, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), are not exclusive
but permit a litigant to sue in, among other places, the place of work of a high agency official, which is typically the District. See Solimine, supra note 101, at 127; Cass R. Sunstein,
Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976, 982–85 (1982) (discussing “[v]enue in [a]dministrative [r]eview”).
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eral judges serving on these courts in dealing with complex and important legal and policy questions has led the D.C. Circuit to be tout135
ed as the second-most important court in the United States.
The District of Columbia Circuit is rightly regarded as being
staffed with highly qualified judges who perform good work on difficult and important cases, often in the area of administrative and regulatory law. This specialization does not spill over, however, into constitutional law as such, much less questions regarding the
constitutionality of federal statutes. There is no reason federal judges
in the District carry more knowledge or insight about such questions
as compared to federal judges sitting elsewhere in the United States.
The vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the District over many administrative or regulatory matters may well be efficient and justified, but
it is an exception to the general, long-standing notion that the re136
gional dispersion of the federal courts is the better practice. Placing exclusive jurisdiction in the District carries with it the potential
detriments of any specialized court, such as the politicization of the
judicial selection process for the court, or the undue influence of a
137
specialized bar or other interest groups. In recent years, there has
been political controversy over the nominations of judges on the D.C.
Circuit by both Democratic and Republican presidents, when the
Senate was controlled by the other party. Until filibuster rules were
controversially changed for such nominations late in 2013, vacancies
138
There has also
on the D.C. Circuit had gone unfilled for years.

135
136

137
138

The D.C. Circuit has replaced the Second Circuit as enjoying this label. For discussion of
the switch, see Solimine, supra note 101, at 1332 n.5, 1353–61.
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS: AS APPROVED BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 43 (1995) (“History suggests the value of maintaining regional connections between appellate judges and the trial judges
whose decisions they review, and between appellate judges and the litigants who appear
in their courts.”); POSNER, supra note 17, at 258–59 (supporting regional dispersion of
federal appellate courts).
See BAUM, supra note 16, at 34–41 (discussing “the effects of specialization on the substance of judicial policy”).
For overviews of the recent controversy over nominations to the D.C. Circuit, see Carl
Hulse, G.O.P. Stirring Feud in Senate On U.S. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, at A1; Doug
Kendall & Simon Lazarus, Broken Circuit, 30 ENVTL. F. 36 (2013); Jeremy W. Peters, Senate
Vote Curbs Filibuster Power to Stall Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013, at A1. Earlier, several
Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced a bill that would reduce the number of full-time judges on the D.C. Circuit from eleven to eight. Court Efficiency Act of 2013, S. 699, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(1)(2013). Supporters of the bill argued
that the reduction was justified by that circuit’s comparatively small caseload. Critics argued that it was an effort to prevent President Obama from filling vacancies on that
court. Michael D. Shear & Jeremy Peters, Judicial Picks Set the Stage for a Battle In the Senate,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A12. That all said, there appears to be less controversy over
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been long-standing, if more muted, controversy over the vesting of
jurisdiction in the District over disputes mainly concerning other
139
parts of the United States.
The federal courts in the D.C. Circuit loomed large in the litiga140
tion culminating in Shelby County v. Holder, in which the Supreme
Court held the current version of the preclearance provision of the
141
Voting Rights Act (VRA) unconstitutional. That provision required
certain jurisdictions to pre-clear election law changes by seeking the
approval of either the Department of Justice or of a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia. The legislative history of the
latter provision indicates that exclusive venue was placed in the District, due to the fear (at least in 1965, the year of initial passage) that
federal judges in the South would not be sympathetic to enforcement
of the VRA, and that judges in Washington might eventually build up
142
expertise in and generate uniform law on these matters. The procedural posture of Shelby County was such that the constitutional attack on the preclearance provision was brought before a single district judge in the District of Columbia, with the usual appellate

139

140
141

142

the appointment of district judges for the District, who (unlike in other circuits) are rarely elevated to the court of appeals.
For discussion, see Thomas O. McGarity, Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of
Administrative Action, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 302, 308 (1980) (discussing a dispute over the District of Columbia Circuit’s jurisdiction); Edward M. Mullins & Rima Y. Mullins, You Better
Shop Around: Appellate Forum Shopping, 25 LITIGATION 32, 35 (1999); Sunstein, supra note
134, at 979 (discussing “venue reform proposals” that would “bar institution of suit in the
District of Columbia unless the agency decision under review had a substantial local impact”).
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
Specifically, the majority of the Court held unconstitutional the coverage formula, section
4 of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b, thus negating use of the preclearance requirements of
section 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“The Court stops any application of § 5 [of the VRA] by holding that § 4(b)’s coverage
formula is unconstitutional.”).
For discussion of the motivations of the drafters of the preclearance provision in 1965
regarding venue, see ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 16–21 (1987); Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE
SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 378, 379 (Chadler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); Gyung-Ho Jeong, Gary J. Miller & Itai Sened, Closing the Deal: Negotiating Civil Rights Legislation, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 588, 599–601 (2009).
Attempts to broaden venue for preclearance actions, beyond just the federal court in the
District of Columbia, were rejected in the in the 1970 and 1975 reauthorizations. DAVID
J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
OF 1965, at 194–96 (1978) (discussing these attempts); GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD
JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
204–10 (2013) (discussing the Voting Rights Act). See generally Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 784 n.76.
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process thereafter.143 Neither the majority nor the dissent in Shelby
County made any specific qualitative or evaluative reference to the ex144
If Congress revisits
clusive jurisdiction for preclearance litigation.
the preclearance process, it might find it difficult to again vest exclusive jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit, as it would show a lack of confidence, however justified it might have been in 1965, in other federal
145
judges throughout the country.

143

144

145

Given the controversy over the constitutionality of the reauthorization of the preclearance provision in 2006, see, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177
(2005); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J.
174, 186–92 (2007), it is perhaps surprising that Congress did not include a special review
provision to govern an expected constitutional challenge. Perhaps the assumption was
that the three-judge district court convened to hear preclearance actions would naturally
entertain such a challenge, as indeed it did in Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) (noting how the court below addressed the constitutional question), aff’g on other grounds, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge
court). In contrast, the plaintiff in Shelby County did not request preclearance (or a
bailout from preclearance requirements), but rather sought a declaratory judgment. 811
F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 113 S. Ct.
2612 (2013). The same district judge held in related litigation that a three-judge district
court under Section 5 need not be convened to hear a constitutional challenge when that
remedy was sought. See Laroque v. Holder, 755 F. Supp. 2d 156, 165–66 (D.D.C. 2010),
rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2011). For further discussion, see Solimine,
Reapportionment, supra note 42, at 1138–39 & n.151.
Nor did Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Shelby County, 113 S. Ct. at 2631–32
(Thomas, J., concurring), or his dissenting opinion in NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. at 212–29
(Thomas, J., dissenting), both of which concluded that Congress lacked constitutional
power in 2006 to renew § 5 of the VRA.
The decision in Shelby County to strike down the current version of section 4 of the VRA
has made moribund the preclearance provisions of Section 5. This in turn has reinvigorated interest in the heretofore relatively little used “bail-in” provisions of section 3 of the
VRA. Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A1 (discussing how the Obama Administration after Shelby County
is attempting to use Section 3 regarding election law changes in Texas, previously governed by Section 5 preclearance). The bail-in provision, unlike the preclearance provision, first requires that a district court make findings that a state voting practice is unconstitutional, and then retaining jurisdiction to in effect preclear changes to such practices.
42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). Also unlike Section 5, the bail-in provision does not place venue in
the DOJ or the federal courts in D.C., but rather before a three-judge district court in
that state. The reason for the latter difference is not clear. Presumably it was based on
the notion that local federal courts will be more familiar with the facts upon which a finding of unconstitutionality will be based. See Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2008–09
(2010) (“In pocket trigger litigation, however, the local district court regains jurisdiction
and can receive preclearance requests.”). Should Congress revisit Sections 4 and 5 in the
wake of Shelby County, the Section 3 model of vesting enforcement in local three-judge district courts, rather than in the District of Columbia, could provide a model. See Michael
E. Solimine, Rethinking District of Columbia Venue in Voting Rights Preclearance Actions, 102
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 29, 40 (2014) (making this argument).
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In contrast to the VRA, the legislative history of the specialized review provisions, such as it is, says virtually nothing about why the District of Columbia is chosen. Perhaps it is due in part to strategic maneuvering by members of Congress, thinking that federal judges in
the District simply know more about the legislative process and would
be more (or depending on your point of view, less) likely to uphold
the statute. Or, perhaps it is simply more convenient for Congress
(and perhaps the lawyers expected to litigate such matters) to place
jurisdiction in the District, especially given the provisions allowing for
146
Howmembers of Congress to bring suit challenging the statutes.
ever, these are not especially sound reasons to require that such challenges, by members of Congress or anyone else, be brought in the
District. The first contributes to the politicization of the federal
judges in the District. The second elevates convenience to an unreasonably high virtue. The better course, if there has to be special review provisions at all, is to allow venue anywhere in the United States,
147
just as it is with any other suit.
3. Trials by Three Judges, Expediting Decisions, and Supreme Court
Docket Control
In the abstract there is nothing wrong with setting up judicial procedures to require or encourage federal courts to expeditiously decide the constitutionality of federal statutes. Even when promptness
is not directly necessary to the efficient operation of the law (consider, say, the Flag Protection Act), there is something to be said for
questions over a statute that applies to the whole nation and which
must be resolved as quickly as possible. That said, there can be too
much of a good thing. There is considerable evidence that the expediting procedures for the litigation involving the 1974 Amendments
to FECA, and at least in some instances for litigation under the
BCRA, led to hurried proceedings at the lower court levels and an in148
adequate compilation of a record.
146
147

148

For speculations along these lines, see Fraser et al., supra note 101, at 145–48; Solimine,
Institutional, supra note 47, at 773.
Divesting the District of Columbia of exclusive jurisdiction over such cases might admittedly lead to an unseemly race to the courthouse by plaintiffs seeking a favorable forum.
But that is true of other cases and is a necessary consequence and cost of geographically
dispersed lower courts. The other putative benefits of the special review provisions would
still accrue.
See, for example, on the Buckley v. Valeo litigation, Solimine, supra note 47, at 775–76
(“The Justices self-consciously took seriously the mandate to expedite their resolution of
the case, and while it would be unfair to characterize Buckley as a rushed job (and Hasen
does not), certain aspects of the opinion were not well thought out, and some of that
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A related problem is the convening of a three-judge district court
to hold a hearing or trial, in which (among other things) evidence is
taken, a record is assembled, and findings of fact and conclusions of
law are entered, all normally the job of a single district judge. These
are awkward tasks for most federal judges to undertake collectively.
The awkwardness is compounded by the composition of the panel.
At least one judge must be from the appellate court, so the panel
consists of at least one judge who normally does not hold trials, and
one or two trial judges whose work in other cases is reviewed by the
149
same appellate judge. These administrative difficulties, among other things, contributed to the criticisms of the standing three-judge
150
district court before its curtailment in 1976.
These same critics argued that expediting mandates were unnecessary, since judges in the normal three-tier litigation process could,
when necessary and upon request of the parties, expedite the process
151
It is true that modern (i.e., postat the trial and appellate levels.
1976) three-judge district litigation has a generally admirable record
in rapidly litigating cases to final disposition (when there is an ap-

149

150
151

might be attributable to the unusual procedural posture of the case.”); Panas, supra note
12, at 167–68 (“The Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo is probably the most notorious example of expedited review occurring in an abstract factual context.”). On McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), see Solimine, Institutional, supra note 47, at 776–79 (discussing
“the effect of the special review provisions in McConnell). On the other hand, many of the
special review statutes seem to in effect authorize, and commonly lead to, facial constitutional attacks on statutes, as opposed to as-applied attacks. In theory, it would seem that
this would mean less of a need to develop an extensive record at the trial level. No doubt,
there are many exceptions to the generalization just made, with McConnell being a notable example. In any event, Professor Fallon’s recent empirical study has considerably undermined the conventional wisdom that facial attacks on statutes are generally rare and
unsuccessful in the Supreme Court. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction
About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915 (2011).
For discussion of these problems affecting three-judge district courts in general, see Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 42, at 116–18. For discussion on how these factors were arguably demonstrated at the trial level in McConnell, see Solimine, Institutional,
supra note 47, at 777–78. For acknowledgment of the difficulties by judges sitting on
three-judge district courts, see Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 501–02 (D.D.C.
1980) (three-judge court), aff’d by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982). A countervailing consideration could be the possibility of a dissenting opinion on the three-judge
court serving as a signal to the Supreme Court that the issues are contested and thus arguably more worthy of review. For discussion of that factor, drawing on studies of threejudge panels on the courts of appeals, see Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals,
107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998); Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left, Right, and Center:
Strategic Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels, 29 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 638
(2011).
See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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peal) to the Supreme Court. One recent study showed that “the Supreme Court disposes of most cases within about a year or less of the
152
But federal judges are capable of
district court’s final decision.”
similarly swift decision-making under the three-tier process. Consider, again, the litigation that culminated in NFIB v. Sebelius. There, the
federal district court (ten months after suit was filed) rendered a decision on January 31, 2011, and the court of appeals issued its decision on August 12 of that year. The Supreme Court promptly granted certiorari, ordered briefing and held oral arguments, and issued
153
Granted, the individual mandate
its decision on June 28, 2012.
provision of the ACA was not due to go into effect until January 1,
2014, so the federal judges were not under extreme time pressures.
Presumably the Supreme Court could have granted certiorari before
154
judgment in the court of appeals or taken other steps to hasten the
final disposition, if that had been necessary. But the timeline of NFIB
v. Sebelius does suggest that expediting mandates found in statutes are
155
usually not necessary.
While expediting a particular case, direct review may place uncomfortable demands on docket management by the Supreme Court.
During the heyday of the three-judge district court, when such appeals were inundating the Court’s docket, some suggested that these
156
That is, the Court
appeals were forcing the hand of the Court.
could not simply grant or deny certiorari; instead, it needed to osten157
sibly decide the case on the merits. The Court responded by decid152
153
154

155

156

157

Douglas, supra note 70, at 459. The conclusion is based on a review of the three-judge
district court decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court from 2000 to 2009. Id. at 459–62.
For a listing of the decisions of the three courts, see supra note 5.
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012) (“Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by . . . writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or
criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . . . .”).
In this regard, consider the extensive litigation which challenged on constitutional and
statutory grounds other aspects of the ACA. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A New Wave of Challenges to Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2013, at A1 (discussing some of these challenges).
For example, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius, there was a “flood of lawsuits”
challenging, on First Amendment free exercise grounds and under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., another provision (and its implementing regulations) of the ACA requiring employers to cover birth control in employee
health plans. See Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits on the Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2013, at A1. That litigation culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), rendered only two years after Sebelius.
See Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 42, at 105 (“Another commentator has
argued that direct review ‘forc[es] the hand of the Supreme Court without benefit of prior appellate review.’”(citation omitted)).
In its most recent BCRA decision, the Court made the point strongly, observing that on a
direct appeal, it had “‘no discretion to refuse adjudication of the case on its merits.’”
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ing a significant percentage of those cases after full briefing and oral
argument, and the rest by the awkward practice of a one-sentence
summary affirmance, or occasionally a summary reversal. The latter
were ostensibly on the merits, but came to be seen as possessing no
precedential authority. Thus, it was near the functional equivalent of
158
a denial of certiorari.
To be sure, the statutory diminution of the three-judge district
159
court in 1976 and the demise of most other direct appeals by 1988,
160
coupled with the Court’s current shrunken docket, have lessened
caseload pressures on the Court. In light of these developments, the
demands of special review provisions with direct appeals are less of a
burden on the Court. Granting that, the current direct appeals may
still place cases before the Court at inopportune times, before it is
161
Consider here again the continuing
ready to confront the issues.
stream of cases on direct appeal challenging various provisions of the
162
BCRA. In Citizens United, the Court majority reserved the question
of whether its holding extended to political contributions by foreign163
Some observers argued that any restriction of such spending
ers.
by foreigners was at odds with the balance of the analysis of the ma164
A challenge to the BCRA on that ground was promptly
jority.
brought, and the lower court held that the BCRA could constitution165
Rather than fully exally limit spending by foreign contributors.
ploring this potentially important issue, upon a direct appeal, the
166
Court summarily affirmed. Thus, it utilized an old-fashioned safety-

158

159
160
161

162
163
164
165
166

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332, 344 (1975)).
See Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 42, at 107–09 (“Still, the current manner
of disposing of putatively mandatory appeals is not without its costs, which are similar to
those attending the certiorari process.”).
See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
See generally Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012).
Cf. David Fontana, Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624, 624 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (“[C]ourts
deciding constitutional cases benefit from having the power to set their agenda . . . .”)
See supra note 52. At one point I referred to these cases as causing the Court “BCRAfatigue.” Solimine, Institutional, supra note 42, at 779.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2009).
E.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581,
605–10 (2011) (discussing foreign spending).
Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court).
132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press
Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 415-16 & n.12 (2013) (stating that the Citizens United opinion is “overly long and unfocused. It seems to stretch for unnecessarily broad interpretations of free speech law . . . . Already the Court has been forced to cut back on one of the
broader possible implications . . . .”) (citing the summary affirmance in Bluman).
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valve to avoid confronting a potentially difficult case. Absent the direct appeal, it may have waited until one or more courts of appeal
decisions had been rendered before resolving the issue.
C. Reconsidering the Constitutional Doubt Canon
In their new treatise on statutory interpretation quoted at the beginning of this article, Justice Scalia and Professor Garner critically
examine the venerable canon that federal statutes should, if necessary, be construed to avoid a reading that would render them unconstitutional. As they observe, this canon of statutory construction is
premised on a “genuine assessment of probable meaning” on behalf
167
of Congress. The legislature presumably only wishes to enact lawful
statutes, so it should not be “presumed to be sailing close to the wind,
so to speak—entering an area of questionable constitutionality with168
out making that entrance utterly clear.” Justice Scalia and Professor
Garner continue that the presumption may not be justified today.
Congress does sail close to the wind “all the time[,]” and the “questionable constitutionality” is evidenced and indeed acknowledged,
they say, by Congress through the presence of special review provi169
sions in statutes. Despite this criticism, Justice Scalia and Professor
Garner ultimately conclude that the constitutional doubt canon
170
should continue to be supported.
Despite their ultimate reticence, a plausible inference of Justice
Scalia and Professor Garner’s view of the special review provisions is
that the canon should not hold, or perhaps should even be reversed,
when a statute under constitutional attack contains such a provi171
sion. A full discussion of the considerable debate over the canon is
172
beyond the scope of this Article. What is worth addressing here is
167
168
169
170
171

172

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 248.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 249. They argue that “ [a] more plausible basis for the rule is that it represents judicial policy” to minimize “judicial conflicts with the legislature.” Id.
In an earlier reference to these provisions, Justice Scalia stated that “‘if Congress is going
to take the attitude that it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court
worry about the Constitution,’ then ’perhaps th[e] presumption [that acts of Congress
are constitutional] is unwarranted.’” Devins, supra note 92, at 280 n.69 (quoting Stuart
Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, 32 NAT’L J. 1810, 1811 (2000) available at
http://nationaljournal.com/magazine/judiciary-the-tipping-point-20000610).
For articles discussing the debate over the canon, see, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W.
Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1715 (2013); John Copeland Nagle, Deleware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1495 (1997); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71; Adrian
Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional
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whether Scalia and Garner are correct to identify the special review
provisions as signals of the alleged constitutional questionability of
federal statutes.
In my view, Justice Scalia and Professor Garner give too much
weight to the presence of special review provisions in particular statutes. It is true, as they point out, that many of the statutes with such
provisions have been later held to be unconstitutional, in whole or in
173
But the Court has not held all such
part, by the Supreme Court.
174
statutes to be unconstitutional, and others have been resolved by
175
the Supreme Court on other grounds. While the number of such
176
statutes is not trivial, or most do not deal with trivial matters, the
sample size is relatively small to draw definitive conclusions about
congressional signaling. Moreover, the rate of unconstitutionality of
such statutes cannot be said to be strikingly different from that of all
considerations of the constitutionality of federal statutes by the
Court. Recent studies indicate that throughout American history, the
Court has considered the constitutionality of a federal statute about
792 times, and struck down the statute 173 times, or about 22% of the
177
time. This is not a robust rate of unconstitutionality, showing Con-

173
174

175

176
177

Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549
(2000); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 947–48 (2013) (discussing survey of congressional staffers tasked with
drafting legislation which found that most were unaware of the constitutional avoidance
canon, but most also anticipated that the courts would rule on the constitutionality of
statutes). For an analysis of Scalia and Garner’s treatment of the constitutional avoidance
canon in their treatise, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 543, 569 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)). None of these
sources specifically address what interpretive weight, if any, courts should give to the
presence or absence of special review provisions.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 248–49 nn. 7–9 (giving examples of statutes declared
unconstitutional). They do not cite instances of such statutes being upheld. See id.
See, e.g., the initial adjudication of the BCRA, supra note 51, and the adjudications of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Decency Act, supra note 56, of the census reform legislation, supra note 61, and of the REAL ID Act, supra note 63.
In several instances the Court has declined to review lower court decisions upholding
statutes with special review provisions. For examples, see supra notes 62, 65, & 66. In the
litigation over the census reform legislation, the majority of the Court (perhaps ironically) employed the constitutional doubt canon to resolve the case on non-constitutional
grounds. See supra note 6.
Some might include the Saxbe Fix statutes in the category of trivia, but the BCRA and
many of the other statutes clearly do not fall into that category.
Jenna Becker Kane & David Adamany, Judicial Activism Once Again Reconsidered, 21 TABLE 3
(2013) (presenting data from Marshall through Roberts Courts) (paper presented at annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 11–14, 2013, Chicago,
Ill.)(on file with author).
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gress sailing close to the wind. But the rate is much higher for recent
decades. In the Warren through Roberts Courts, the numbers and
178
The rate of unconstiturate are 247, 104, and 42%, respectively.
tionality is higher than that for the recent statutes with the special review provisions, and the difference is accentuated by the fact that the
overall figures include the adjudications involving the latter statues.
Nonetheless, it cannot be said the finding of unconstitutionality is a
rare event, with the latter statutes being a conspicuous exception.
The overall context of the passage of statutes with special review
provisions also undercuts Justice Scalia and Professor Garner’s posi179
tion. As I earlier argued, a richer and more realistic appraisal of
the reasons Congress passes these provisions suggests that it is not
merely indicative of Congress mindlessly sailing close to the wind. Instead, a confluence of rational and practical reasons, similar to that
which attends the passage of most legislation, explains why Congress
included the special review provisions. I do not find these reasons to
be especially convincing as a matter of policy, and I ultimately concluded that their possibly negative effects on decision-making by low180
er federal courts and the Supreme Court suggest that Congress
should not utilize these provisions. Nonetheless, these criticisms do
not support the strong version of the argument that the special review provisions are unambiguous signals of probable unconstitutionality to the federal courts. Rather, the rationales and effects of the
provisions are on the whole ambiguous, so federal courts should be
hesitant to draw interpretive conclusions from their presence or absence in particular statutes.
D. Summing Up
The conventional critique of the special review provisions contends that they are examples of Congress abdicating its responsibility
to take seriously the constitutional validity of statutes it passes. This
critique is incomplete. While it is true that Congress in recent decades has, by traditional measures, devoted less attention to the constitutional status of statutes it considers and may enact, it does not follow that the special review provisions are especially problematic
examples of that tendency. Congressional motivation can be multifarious when it comes to any statute, and in my view the legislative
record on these provisions is no different. Congressional abdication
178
179
180

Id.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
See supra Part IV.B.
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of constitutional responsibility may play a part, but the provisions can
also be conceptualized as Congress taking those responsibilities seriously for that particular statute, by inviting the federal courts (and often the most prestigious lower court) to rule quickly on the constitutional issues.
Despite this somewhat more benign view of the legislative purpose
of the special review provisions, I still conclude that they are not
sound additions to the institutional structure of federal courts. There
are several aspects of their effect on federal court decision-making
that is troublesome. These include the lack of percolation, the unnecessary directives for rapid decisions, and the unnecessary exclusive
venue often placed in the federal court for the District of Columbia.
These negative effects on the judicial decision-making process outweigh the modest, possibly positive impact the provisions have on a
dialogue between Congress and the federal courts. The normal federal court process to determine the constitutionality of federal statutes is up to the task, and the special review provisions are unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Since 1803 the federal courts have possessed the authority to consider the constitutionality of federal statutes. For most years since
1891, that sort of litigation, and most other litigation as well, has taken place within the now familiar three-tier process, of a trial court decision by a single judge, followed by a right of appeal to a three-judge
panel on a regional court of appeals (sometimes augmented by en
banc review), followed (since 1925) by discretionary review in the Supreme Court. Congress experimented with a different approach
from 1937 to 1976, with three-judge district courts being convened to
hear constitutional challenges to a federal statute, followed by a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. After critics, including Justices on
the Court itself, pointed to administrative burdens and the arguable
lack of reason for this different process, Congress repealed the experiment.
However, since the abandonment of the standing (if temporarily
convened) three-judge district court, Congress has seen fit to place
similar provisions in a number of particular federal statutes. They are
similar but not identical to the prior experiment, and to each other,
but the new provisions typically also mandate that the suit be brought
in the District Court for the District of Columbia, that members of
Congress can bring or intervene in such suits, and that federal judges
should expeditiously decide the cases. The ostensible reasons for
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these provisions are doubts about the constitutionality of the statutes,
and a perceived need to quickly decide such cases and resolve constitutional questions about a statute. These are the new specialized (albeit temporarily-convened) federal constitutional courts.
There is nothing sacred about our current federal judicial architecture, but any significant deviation should, in my view, be justified.
There are not convincing justifications for these specialized constitutional courts. I do not take the view of some critics that they are unqualified evidence of the constitutional weakness of a particular statute, or of abdication by Congress of its responsibility to seriously
consider the constitutionality of legislation it enacts. Other, more
mundane reasons may account for the proliferation of these provisions. However, I conclude that the provisions are on balance unnecessary and in some ways may be harmful to the consideration of
these important constitutional issues, by, among other things, potentially depriving the Supreme Court of the percolation of views by
more than one lower federal court.
The best path, then, would be for Congress not to further enact
these provisions. Should it insist on doing so, however, Congress
should draft them in different ways. It should replicate more closely
the experiment from 1937 to 1976 which, for all of its infirmities,
cannot be said to have been a disaster. Members of Congress can do
so by placing these provisions in the bills originally introduced, rather
than adding them, as they often are, in last-minute final votes on the
floor of Congress. This would serve the salutary purposes of alerting
the rest of the Congress that there may indeed be special constitutional issues with that particular statute, and permitting discussion of
181
the necessity of the special review provisions themselves. Likewise,
there is no need to place exclusive jurisdiction in the District of Columbia or of formally mandating expeditious treatment. The former
inappropriately elevates the importance of federal courts in the District, and the latter is unnecessary, as experience shows that federal
judges can, when requested and when necessary, rapidly decide cases.
These would be sounder attributes of specialized federal constitutional courts.

181

Cf. Hanah Metchis Volokh, Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress, 65 FLA. L. REV.
173, 214–15 (2013) (arguing that constitutional authority statements should be required
at earlier and multiple times in the legislative process, to have desired effect on congressional deliberation).

